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Abstract 
The Japanese-African aid relationship has evolved since World War Two. The majority of 
studies on Japan’s role in Africa have focused on the economic aspect, while Japan’s aid 
relationship with Africa remains a relatively underexplored area of enquiry. This thesis aims 
to contribute to the study of Japanese-African relations by focusing on the role of aid in 
Japan’s involvement with the continent. The research question focuses on the evolution of 
Japan’s aid relationship with sub-Saharan Africa and the factors that have shaped this 
relationship. The study is qualitative and exploratory in nature and makes use mostly of 
secondary sources. Theoretically, the study analyses the aid relationship with reference to 
three sources of motivation for the provision of aid, namely economic, political and moral 
rationales. 
 
The findings of this study highlight the fact that, before 1990, Japan’s aid relationship with 
Africa was motivated by all three rationales. From an economic perspective, aid served as 
security for resources from Africa especially after the oil crisis of 1973. From a political 
perspective, Japan’s aid relationship served a number of objectives that changed over time.  
The study highlights these changes, suggesting that, from a political perspective, Japan’s aid 
in respect of Africa initially served to play a critical role in the Western camp in its anti-
communist struggle on the continent. It was also used to curb criticism directed at Japan by 
African countries for its pro-Pretoria policy. 
 
After 1990, Japan’s aid relationship with Africa from political perspective served Japan’s 
ambition to be recognised as a political power, most importantly to receive the support from 
Africa that would allow Japan to secure a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council. From an economic perspective, it served to secure strategic natural 
resources for Japan that would sustain its growing economy and help to achieve its ambition 
of attaining global economic supremacy. From a moral perspective, the aid relationship 
served to promote a development path for Africa similar to that experienced in Japan’s Asian 
neighbourhood. 
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Japan’s aid relationship with sub-Saharan Africa can be explained from a realist perspective, 
since the country’s national interests played a key role in the distribution of aid in this region. 
It has been important for Japan to maintain its momentum regarding global economic 
prominence and influence and for it to try to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council. By distributing aid to Africa, it has hoped to improve its chances of achieving its 
economic ambition and importantly its elevation to the Security Council. The study thus 
suggests that political ambitions have been the primary motivating factor in the distribution 
of aid in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
The areas for further investigation, as highlighted by the findings of this study, are as follows: 
Japan’s aid relationship with Africa remains a relatively new area of inquiry and more 
research could therefore be done given the available data. The study also highlights the 
political perspective as the primary motivating factor for Japan’s aid relationship with Africa. 
This served Japan’s ambitions of being recognised as a global political player that would find 
its greatest expression in securing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council with the 
assistance of African nations. Future studies could investigate whether Japan has managed to 
achieve its global political ambition and whether African countries played a significant role 
in this process. Finally, future studies could study the effectiveness of the TICAD process and 
whether Japan’s non-Western approach to development remains a popular model. 
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Opsomming 
Die hulpverhouding tussen Japan en Afrika het sedert die Tweede Wêreldoorlog ontvou. Die 
studie van Japan se rol in Afrika het tot dusver grootliks op die ekonomiese aspek 
gekonsentreer, terwyl Japan se hulpverlening aan Afrika’n betreklik onderontginde studieveld 
bly. Hierdie tesis wil tot die studie van Japan-Afrika-betrekkinge bydra deur op Japan se 
hulpverlening aan die vasteland te konsentreer. Die navorsingsvraag handel oor die 
ontwikkeling van Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika suid van die Sahara, en die faktore wat 
hierdie verhouding gevorm het. Die studiemetodologie is kwalitatief en verkennend, en maak 
hoofsaaklik van sekondêre bronne gebruik. Wat teorie betref, ontleed die studie die 
hulpverhouding aan die hand van drie motiverings vir hulpverlening, naamlik ekonomiese, 
politieke en morele beweegredes. 
 
Die studieresultate toon dat Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika voor 1990 deur ál drie 
bogenoemde beweegredes aangevuur is. Uit ’n ekonomiese hoek het hulp as sekuriteit vir 
hulpbronne uit Afrika gedien, veral ná die oliekrisis van 1973. Uit ’n politieke hoek het Japan 
se hulpverhouding met Afrika ’n aantal oogmerke help bevorder wat mettertyd verander het. 
Die studie beklemtoon hierdie veranderinge, en doen aan die hand dat, wat politiek betref, 
Japan se hulpverlening aan Afrika aanvanklik belangrik was in die Westerse kamp se stryd 
teen kommunisme op die Afrikavasteland. Dit is ook gebruik om Afrika-kritiek op Japan se 
pro-Pretoria-beleid te smoor. 
 
Ná 1990 het die hulpverhouding met Afrika Japan op politieke gebied help naam maak en 
veral Afrikasteun help werf om ’n permanente setel vir Japan in die Veiligheidsraad te 
bekom. Uit ’n ekonomiese hoek het dit as waarborg gedien vir strategiese natuurlike 
hulpbronne wat Japan se groeiende ekonomie kon ondersteun en tot sy strewe na wêreldwye 
ekonomiese heerskappy kon bydra. Uit ’n morele perspektief wou Japan Afrika ’n 
soortgelyke ontwikkelingsroete as dié van Japan se Asiatiese bure laat inslaan. 
 
Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika suid van die Sahara kan aan die hand van die realistiese 
perspektief verklaar word, aangesien die land se nasionale belange ’n kernrol in die 
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verspreiding van hulp na hierdie streek gespeel het. Vir Japan was dit belangrik om sy 
stukrag in die strewe na wêreldwye ekonomiese statuur en invloed te behou en ’n permanente 
setel in die Veiligheidsraad te probeer bekom. Deur hulp aan Afrika te verleen, het Japan 
gehoop om sy kanse op sukses in sy ekonomiese strewes en veral ook sy verheffing tot die 
Veiligheidsraad te verbeter. Die studie gee dus te kenne dat politieke ambisies die 
hoofbeweegrede was vir hulpverlening aan Afrika suid van die Sahara. 
 
Gebiede vir verdere navorsing wat uit die bevindinge van hierdie studie spruit, is soos volg: 
Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika bly ’n betreklik nuwe studieveld met min beskikbare 
data, dus is verdere navorsing daaroor nodig. Meer bepaald beklemtoon die studie die 
politieke perspektief as hoofbeweegrede vir Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika: Dit het 
Japan as internasionale politieke speler help vestig, en Afrikalande sou Japan uiteindelik help 
om die gesogte permanente setel in die Veiligheidsraad te bekom. Toekomstige studies kan 
verken of Japan in sy internasionale politieke strewe geslaag het en watter rol Afrikalande 
daarin gespeel het. Laastens kan verdere studies ook ondersoek instel na die TIKAO-proses 
en of Japan se nie-Westerse benadering tot ontwikkeling ’n gewilde model bly. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and problem statement 
 
1.1 Background and rationale 
Japan’s fortunes in the aftermath of World War Two (WWII) changed dramatically and 
impressively. This was due to the spectacular expansion of its economy which inevitably 
entered the 21st century as the second-largest economy in the world. Significantly, Japan has 
been, and remains poor in natural resources and it would not be unreasonable to ask what the 
basis for its rapid economic transformation was? Japan has always been of strategic 
importance to the West especially to the United States of America (US). This was most 
evident during the Cold War era, where, for a considerable time after WWII, Japan’s 
engagement with the world was determined by the Western bloc.  As Tishehyar (2010:91) 
observes, “the cornerstone of Japan’s   foreign relations from 1945 through today is the 
United States which provides Japan’s military security, its largest market, and sponsorship in 
the world economy”.  
 
Japan’s foreign policy propelled her recovery from the ruins of the Second World War 
(WWII) to become a fully industrialised country by the end of the 20th century. The country’s 
foreign policy pursued the path of diplomacy, which began after Japan’s entry into the United 
Nations in December of 1956. “The three pillars of Japanese diplomacy centred on Japan 
conforming to UN diplomacy,  being a key role player in the Asian region, and aligning with 
the capitalist West” (Tishehyar, 2010:92).  
 
Japan’s diplomacy, as expressed in the first issue of its Diplomatic Blue Book in 1957, 
specified economic diplomacy as one of the main pillars of its foreign policy. It was in the 
light of this that Japan began to develop economic international relations. During the late 
1950s and 1960s, Japan’s rapidly growing economy demanded that the country seek new 
markets to secure the necessary resources to sustain her energy-deficient country. This 
propelled Japan to enter a relationship with sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as the region was rich 
in natural resources which Japan has always needed. 
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Post-WWII, economic diplomacy was not the only factor driving Japanese foreign policy. As 
it was aligned with the West, consideration of international circumstances throughout the 
second half of the 20th century influenced Japan’s foreign policy, especially during the Cold 
War’s anti-communist struggles. Humanitarian considerations were also given some 
expression and with these two other important influence in foreign diplomacy the role of aid 
emerged. “Japan’s foreign aid programme included the ‘development of developing 
countries’ and ‘support for her self-help efforts towards economic and social development” 
(Eyinla, 1999:409).  
 
SSA has been a recipient of Japanese aid throughout the 20th century, but especially during 
the Cold War when exchanges between the two partners increased. According to Eyinla 
(1999), Japan’s aid policy was meant to serve three objectives. First “to complement and 
reinforce America’s geo-strategic and ideological interest within the framework of the United 
States/Japan co-operative strategic aid policy. Second, it was used as an instrument for 
securing access to raw and mineral resources. Lastly, aid became the most useful diplomatic 
instrument for placating the African states for the rising criticism against Japan for its 
position as the leading trading partner to apartheid South Africa” (Eyinla, 1999:413). One 
can, therefore, draw from this source that Japan’s aid relationship with the continent was not 
without its complexities in an international context and it was one of the challenges which 
Japan had to consider in its foreign policy. 
 
From the 1950s Japan had to confront and address a great number of issues in the relationship 
with SSA despite the surge of contact and exchanges between them. Over time, Japanese/sub-
Saharan African relations were monitored in economic terms and it appears that an 
asymmetrical relationship developed where the financial purse of Japan influenced the nature 
of the relationship and made it difficult for Africa to assume a position of parity. This was 
driven by Japan’s fast growing economy and poor natural resources and SSA’s abundance of 
natural resources and poor economic position. When Japan began to develop relations with 
the continent in earnest, it was also an important time for Africa which was going through 
decolonisation. At the time, the former colonial masters were still established on the 
continent - something which Japan had to be mindful of in its engagement with Africa. From 
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the 1970s especially, this was the context in which foreign aid began to play a more 
significant role. This period will be covered in greater detail in later chapters. 
 
It is hoped that the examination of aid as a tool of Japanese foreign policy in Africa will give 
insight into how this helped the Asian country to uphold and maintain its relationship with 
the continent. Previously, minimal attention was given to the subject of aid in Japan’s ties 
with Africa, but as this has increasingly become an important part of the relationship, this 
study intends to address this-lack of focus. It is hoped that new data used in the study will 
provide a deeper understanding of these ties. 
 
The limited research on Japanese-SSAfrican relations is partly due to the fact that this is 
relatively new area of enquiry. Significantly, much of the literature focuses mostly on the 
diplomatic and economic ties between these partners and less on aid. Japanese economic 
interests with the continent and its dual policy towards colour (race) and culture have been 
given considerable focus. While there is data on Japan’s relationship with South Africa as an 
economic and diplomatic partner there is a lack of data on the aid relationship between the 
two countries. It is important to consider - South Africa in Japan’s aid relationship with the 
rest of Africa as it was one of the strongest relations Japan had with the continent. 
 
The rationale for this study is to address the deficiencies in the literature with a relatively new 
area of enquiry. This will bring a new element: understanding that aid has been used as a 
diplomatic as well as political instrument.  By so doing this thesis aims to establish an 
important shift in thinking about the way aid is used as a tool for political and diplomatic 
gain. It is worth pointing out here that Japan, as the only major industrial nation not to have 
colonised in Africa, was able to develop a unique relationship with SSA in the post-colonial 
era. 
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1.2    Research question 
The thesis will focus on the following questions: 
1. How has Japan’s aid relationship with the African continent evolved and what are the 
factors which have shaped this relationship? 
The research shall be narrowed down to address the following sub-questions: 
1.1 What are the patterns in Japanese aid to Africa and the factors that shape them? 
1.2What is the place of aid in Japan’s strategic relationship with the African continent? 
1.3What are the intentions regarding Japanese aid to Africa post-2012? 
 
It is important to establish the time frame when raising these questions. For this study, the aid 
relationship between Japan and SSA from the 1960s to 2011 will be examined but more 
attention will be given to the period 1990 to 2011. The reason for the focus on 1990 – 2011 is 
firstly; that the data available covers this period and it is also a time when Japan’s aid policy 
was clearly articulated. Therefore, objectives could be measured consistently. Also, during 
this time, Japan increased its visibility on the continent by developing several close links. 
 
1.3   Literature review 
1.3.1 Japanese Foreign Policy 
The evolution of Japanese foreign policy was influenced considerably by the Second World 
War and the Cold War.  Kosaka (1977) puts forward the notion that Japan’s defeat in WWII 
and the influence of the Cold War which followed, temporarily clarified Japan’s international 
position: defeat in the war weakened the country, and the Cold War firmly attached Japan to 
the West. In addition, with a weak military force during the Cold War and the heavy reliance 
on raw material imports, there were limits to the country’s bargaining power.  Tishehyar 
(2010) argues that Japan’s foreign policy hinged upon the Japanese/American alliance. He 
observes that Japan’s foreign policy from 1945 up to the present day was based on its 
relationship with America which provided Japan’s military security, its largest market, and 
sponsorship for the world market. However, its foreign policy differs in that the basis for 
Japan’s international relations was its separation of economics and politics (seikei bunri) 
which emphasises economics relations without political interference. It was this principle of 
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separation of politics and economics that emerged in the relationship with SSA and was also 
particularly significant in Japan’s relationship with South Africa (which will be discussed in 
the latter part of this thesis). Tishehyar’s work does well to highlight these two factors - the 
importance and influence of the U.S. on Japanese foreign policy and the separation of politics 
and economics in Japan’s international engagements. In the process of answering the primary 
question, this study will elaborate further on both factors. 
 
The work of Scalapino is another study discussing a widely recognised phenomenon of 
Japan’s post-war foreign policy. He notes Japanese foreign policy has, from the start, placed 
economics at the centre of its objectives. However, the author does not claim this to be the 
only aspect but regards it as - one through which many attempts are made to understand its 
complexities. The assumption for this, as Scalapino (1977) states, is from the American 
tradition. The author draws attention to the economic relations between the Western 
industrial powers under US leadership and the underdeveloped world by highlighting both the 
implicit - and often explicit premise in the policies of all post-war Japanese governments - 
that economics and politics are separated in foreign policy. Therefore, the one-dimensional 
approach to the complex subject is avoided by this author as he is responsive to both 
domestic and international circumstances in the policy’s evolution.  
 
Green (2001) highlights Japan’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. He draws 
attention to, and recognises Japan’s essential relationship with the US as the indispensable 
core of Japan’s position in the world. Green examines how the US and Japan interact in 
relation to the rest of the world and he provides several case studies to show how  Japan’s 
foreign policy takes its bearing from Washington. The author does well to emphasize this 
phenomenon as it lends a broader perspective to the relationship between Japan and SSA.  
Another important factor he highlights is that Japanese foreign policy continues to rely 
primarily on economic tools to achieve power and influence. These tools range from foreign 
aid and contributions to international organisations. This economic factor, especially in terms 
of foreign aid will be a focus of this study. 
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The importance of economic tools in Japan’s foreign policies is also highlighted by Togo 
(2010).  As economic assistance - known as Official Development Assistance (ODA), is said 
to be the most consistent and effective tool of Japanese foreign policy, the historical analysis 
of foreign aid makes this author’s work particularly relevant for this study. However, Togo 
does not elaborate on the relationship between Japan and SSA and does not discuss all the 
aspects of Japan’ foreign policy. 
 
Inoguchi and Jain (2000) present a comprehensive picture of Japan’s foreign policy and its 
development throughout the 1990s. They point out that Japan’s initiative, political leadership 
and a genuine desire to assist international communities evolved in some policy areas such as 
ODA, humanitarian assistance, and global environmental policy. The study shows that Japan, 
as the second largest global economy at the time was also being urged to play a constructive 
role in international affairs. In moving away from the established discussions regarding 
Japan’s foreign policies the study deals at length with a particular subject, from a particular 
time frame and,  what the authors manage to establish is that Japanese foreign policies are 
expressed not only through economic factors, but also through humanitarianism. 
 
Given that the independent aspect of Japan’s foreign policy is expressed through its ODA 
volume and disbursement, Akiko (2000) examines the past five decades of Japan’s economic 
assistance from recipient to provider. The author discusses Japan’s engagement in economic 
assistance especially ODA, which made Japan the top donor in the 1990s. The emphasis here 
is on the link between Japan’s economic recovery and the provision of ODA. As such, 
through Akiko one gets an appreciation of the evolution of Japan’s economic assistance 
policies and an understanding that often provision of aid or any other form of economic 
assistance is greatly influenced by a nation’s economic might.   
 
Chan (1992) looks more closely at Japan’s bilateral aid programmes in an effort to gain 
greater insight into Japan’s economic and political statecraft. The author analyses the 
distribution pattern of Japanese foreign aid yen in an attempt to infer the concerns and goals 
that motivate its leaders. The central hypothesis the author makes is that Japan has pursued 
two broad goals in allocating foreign aid: the maintenance of the capitalist world order and 
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the enhancement of the Japanese position in it. This emphasis on international stabilization 
and sectarian advantage has led to certain ambivalence in Tokyo’s foreign policy. 
 
Otopalik (2010), in a journal article, assesses the degree to which Japan’s aid provision 
conforms to the expectations of recipients.  The findings in the study demonstrate that on a 
macro-level analysis, Japan has indeed made good on its pledges. However, investigation of 
several cases of some specific country’s poor or declining performance reveal inconsistencies 
between pledge principles rewarding positive performance in aid provision.  
  
Further aspects of Japanese foreign policy are by different scholars. Drifte (2000) - focuses 
extensively on the domestic context of foreign policy-making and the interplay between the 
economic, political and security factors. Furthermore, the author highlights Japan’s 
calculations in the complex relationships it has with much of a significant part of the world. 
Cooney (2007) presents a change in Japanese foreign policy in his analysis on what the 
Japanese elite and public believe to be their country’s best role for their domestic security.  
 
The importance of all the above is that they offer some background to understand Japan’s 
approach to international relations: what its primary motivations are; the history of Japan’s 
engagement with the world; whether these characteristics appear in its relationship with 
Africa; and whether the reasons which have inspired Japan’s approach on the continent 
remain the same. This research by these authors also reveal that it is without question that the 
Japanese/American alliance had an influence on Japan’s post-war foreign policy but it was 
unique in  the principle of separating politics and economics in its foreign policies. The 
authors cited above deal extensively with these factors, although they are not only issues in 
the complex study of Japan’s foreign policy. 
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1.3.2  Japanese-African Relations 
Ampiah (1997) states that, “the study of Japan’s relations with SSA is virtually a new area of 
inquiry in the analysis of Japan’s international relations” (Ampiah, 1997:1). One factor which 
shaped much of Japan’s foreign policy in Africa was timing. African states were undergoing 
a time of change to independence and democratisation on the continent (started from mid-
1950s) and as the former colonial masters no longer assumed control over their African 
territories, the newly independent states now had to develop their own political, economic 
and diplomatic relations.   As a result greater exchanges between Japan and the continent 
began. 
 
Ampiah (1997) provides an account of Japan’s relationship with South Africa. He also gives 
considerable attention to Japan’s investment and aid to Nigeria and Tanzania respectively. 
After an empirical analysis of political, economic and diplomatic factors that contributed to 
Japan’s relationship with Africa, Ampiah argues that the Japanese concept of security was 
key to its relationship with SSA from 1974 to 1991. He contends that relations between Japan 
and each of these countries were determined differently. In the case of Tanzania, for example, 
Japanese aid was primarily to develop good relations with a frontline state. As such, Tanzania 
was chosen because of its status and political leadership at the time. The relationship between 
Japan and Nigeria, however, was driven primarily by Japan’s need to secure access to 
markets for its growing economy but Ampiah says “Japan was also well aware of the 
constraints that came with this relationship regarding   uncertainty over government policy 
and erratic macro-economic environment in Nigeria” (Ampiah, 1997:196).  
 
Ampiah finds that the relationship with South Africa, however, was shaped by Japan’s need  
to secure specific strategic natural resources which made it difficult for Japan to take a firm 
stance against South Africa for its apartheid policies. The study confirms this by closely 
examining Japan’s voting patterns on this matter at the United Nations. The core argument 
made is that Japan was attending to the interests of the minority regime of South Africa, 
while also fulfilling certain diplomatic responsibilities to its other relationships on the 
continent. It was significant, the author points, out that Japanese foreign policy was 
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successful in addressing these two antithetical issues and, therefore, he considers Japanese 
diplomacy on the continent to have been largely successful. 
 
Adeleke (2010) focuses on the historical development of Nigeria’s relationship with Japan 
during the first 46 years of Nigeria’s independence (1960-2006).  This author points out that 
colonial Nigerian-Japanese relations were essentially economic because the intent was to 
satisfy the economic well-being of the then British colonial government (1914-1960). 
Nigeria’s independence, however, brought cultural and political dimensions into the 
relationship. Adeleke contends that, as a less-developed country, Nigeria can learn a number 
of lessons from Japan’s own quest for development.   
 
Other relationships between Japan and SSA add more to the discussion of Japan’s aid policy 
on the continent. Carvalho (2011) compares Japan’s aid policies to Angola and Mozambique 
since 1950 and asserts that Cold War rivalry prevented Japan from dispatching aid after 1975 
to these communist-led countries after independence, but following the Cold War period 
(1947-1990) Japan then assisted both countries transition from war to peace as part of a 
peaceful nation- building approach. This approach had originated in Japan’s traditional 
development cooperation in Asia. Carvalho’s paper affirms that such decision-making 
reflects Japan’s international pressures and concludes that the Tokyo International 
Conference on African Development (TICAD) approach is very applicable to aid in Africa 
for, peace building and human security. This final point as part of Japanese foreign policy 
will be dealt with in more depth in chapter five. 
 
Morikawa (1997) contributes to the literature by providing a historical account of Japan’s 
African diplomacy stretching as far back as the end of the 19th century. The author sheds light 
on Japan’s relationship with South Africa (even at the height of UN sanction against the 
country) while it simultaneously engaged with a number of SSAfrican countries. Japan’s dual 
diplomacy policy in Africa served its economic interests in Africa while foreign policy 
enabled Japan to become the largest ODA donor for many years on the continent.  As ODA 
was the means by which Japan delivered foreign aid commitments on the continent this will 
be the theme of this study.  
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Another work by Morikawa (2005) discusses a further two key points. Firstly, he examines 
the factors that make an enquiry into Japan’s African diplomacy difficult. Secondly, he looks 
at the current status of Japan’s diplomacy in the post-Cold War/-post-apartheid era and the 
participation of Japanese citizens in formulating and implanting foreign policy into South 
Africa. The author concludes by suggesting that there is a significant gap between words and 
actions in Japan’s African diplomacy. This study will endeavour to examine this claim about 
Japan’s foreign aid commitments to the continent.   
 
Sono (1993) provides further insight into Japanese-Africa relations. He gives a historical 
background of the ties between Japan and Africa as he “examines the nature of African-
Japanese contacts from the 1500 to the early 1990s” (Sono, 1993:1).  The author, well aware 
of the general void in information about Japanese-African relations and exchanges presents 
the earliest contacts between the two partners to allow a greater insight.  He focuses primarily 
on trade, aid and diplomatic relations: the emphasis throughout being that Japan-Africa 
relations stretch over many centuries and are complex by nature.   
 
Other scholars such as Kitagawa (2003) also provide historical accounts of Japanese-African 
relations as well as focus is on economic interests. Kitigawa’s work on the pre-WWII period 
using Japanese Consular Reports covers Japanese trading relation with South Africa. Through 
the reports it is established that during the inter-War period Japan attempted “to carve a niche 
for itself in a region from which she was essentially excluded but one which was increasingly 
seen to be a lifeline for her national economy” (Kitigawa, 2003:39). The circumstances of the 
inter-War years gradually helped expand exchanges with SSA and it was during this period 
that the term economic diplomacy first began to define Japanese-African relations. 
 
Alden and Hirano’s (2003) insights of economic relations between South Africa and Japan 
focus on what effect their economic and political ties had on their respective areas of 
influence. In this regard, the authors essentially give a critical analysis of the various 
dimensions in the relationship between Asia and Africa. They argue that a new trend of quiet 
diplomacy grew as Africa became an important investor destination for Japan and as Japan 
provides Africa with development assistance. They maintain that quiet diplomacy is 
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increasing its impact on African affairs and they say that the relationship which exists 
between Japan and South Africa illustrates this trend.   However, Love (1999) observes that 
the increase in ODA to South Africa, following its transition to majority rule, was largely at 
the expense of other countries in the region. Significantly, he asserts while this refocusing of 
aid was aimed at disadvantaged black groups, it has also reinforced the regional dominance 
of the South African economy in Africa. 
 
Many researchers provide insight into Japan’s outlook on Africa. By shedding light  on the 
evolution of Japan’s economic interests in Africa, Kazuo (2003) says that from the 1960s to 
early 1990s Japan’s standard view of Africa was that it was  a market for Japan’s industrial 
output and a supplier of mineral resources. By the middle of the 1990s, however, this 
traditional diplomatic approach to Africa became outdated. The author explains that Japan’s 
economic and regional crisis during the 1990s jeopardised the enthusiasm to carry the Asian 
experience to Africa. Demachi (2009) also observes that Japanese foreign aid was closely 
intertwined with Japanese economic activities especially in Africa and this relationship 
significantly bolstered Japanese aid.  
 
Previous literature on Japan’s ODA policy carries a number of other explanations. Hook and 
Zhang (1998) show the impact of domestic political interests on the ODA decision-making 
process by examining sets of diplomatic discourses, one of which asserts that the use of aid 
was to advance Japan’s economic interests; and another argues for the use of aid to support 
Japan’s international diplomacy. Katada (2002) emphasizes what the author terms the “two-
track aid” approach: one track affirms that aid provision is shaped by domestic business and 
the other affirms that it is influenced by Japan’s reaction towards international criticism. 
Katada argues that the existence of these two tracks is due to domestic institutional 
constraints and budgetary limitations. Hirata, however, offers another reason for Japanese 
foreign policy decision-making by suggesting that Japan is not monolithic in its 
organizational outlook, but instead reflects diverse views and opinions. 
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Overall, as stated earlier, it can be seen that the literature on Japanese foreign policy towards 
SSA contributes a great deal of understanding to the economic relationship. This study, 
however, will continue to draw out the foreign aid aspects and by so doing, hopes to 
contribute more to the literature. 
 
1.4 Theoretical literature on foreign aid 
Since the first launch of Japan’s ODA programmes in the 1950s, aid provision has proved to 
have been motivated by three criteria: “There is an economic rationale, there is a political 
rationale, and there is a humanitarian motive” (Black, 1968:15). However, other literature on 
the topic suggests more than three main motivating factors for aid provision: political, 
economic, humanitarian and a moral rationale. Hattori (2003) for one believes that the moral 
rationale for aid distribution draws on Aristotelian ethics deeply rooted in Western 
philosophy and reason. However, the political rationale for the provision of aid is the most 
recognized and Black (1968) insists that the primary goal for aid is political: assistance is 
given to developing nations to attain their potential. As aid originated under the complex 
political circumstances of the Cold War, it is not surprising that aid provision has mostly been 
associated with political objectives.  
 
Black and other researchers, however, also argue that there is an economic rationale which is 
directed to secure and promote economic development. “The basic, long-range goal of 
foreign aid is political. It is not economic per se. The primary purpose of foreign aid is to 
supplement and complement the efforts of developing nations to enhance their strength and 
stability” (Black, 1968:18).  In other words, they suggest that economic aid is both a benefit 
to the donor and the recipient as it strengthens the economic development of both. The 
economic rationale not only means that “foreign aid programs of the U.S. and other donor 
nations help to maintain the security of and promote the economic development of the less 
developed nations” (Black, 1968:17) but that within this rationale there is the trade-off 
between developed and less developed nations in which the industrial nations are reliant on 
raw material from less developed nations and in return, less developed nations require goods 
from industrial nations.  
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International Relations (IR) provides three theoretical perspectives to explain the concept of 
foreign aid. The first is that of political realism. As the oldest theoretical perspective in IR, it 
explains foreign aid as a voluntary practice by donors in a materially unequal world between 
donors and recipients. Hattori (2001) stresses this point, adding further that the hierarchical 
political order in the world reflects a skewed distribution of resources. The political realism 
view, therefore, highlights an anarchic world order in which foreign aid reinforces the 
imbalances of resources between donors and recipients. This anarchic world order refers to 
the absence of a “world police government” and therefore governments are not accountable 
to a political structure beyond their borders. Political realists see “aid presupposing a clear 
inequality between donor and recipient, which is conditioned by the superior military strength 
and economic capability of donors, [and which] identifies the conflict between the 
superpowers as the direct cause of foreign aid” (Hattori, 2001:641).  As a result of this 
condition during the Cold War, the conflict between the superpowers spilled over into the 
underdeveloped areas of the world, and as such nations, have had to align themselves during 
the cold war. It was this process that drove foreign aid to become an important instrument for 
Japan. 
 
The other two theoretical perspectives used to explain foreign aid are liberalism and the 
world system theory. “Liberalism refers to foreign aid as a set of measures which promote the 
advancement of political and socio-economic development in the recipient country” (Hattori, 
2001:634). Liberalists believe in human progress and that foreign aid can be used as a tool to 
speed up this process. “Material inequality between donor and recipient is the condition under 
which aid emerges; where aid is seen as a tool which bridges the gap between donors and 
recipients” (Hattori, 2001:639). 
 
The world system theory gives another perspective. This is one that considers foreign aid as a 
hindrance to the development path of recipient countries. “According to world system theory, 
it is a means of constraining the development path of recipient countries, promoting the 
unequal distribution of capital in the world” (Hattori, 2001:634).  The world system theory 
does not support foreign aid as a means of positive change in the recipient countries, but 
rather as reinforcing economic domination of the core industrial nations towards the 
periphery. The proponent in the literature makes the point that foreign aid does not address 
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the existing gaps between donor and recipient but rather contributes to its deterioration. “It is 
the basic operational factor behind the expansion of world capitalism, constraining the 
recipient’s development path to a dependent role in the world market” (Hattori, 2001:639). 
 
1.5  Conceptualization 
Foreign aid, in its current form, was originated by the US in the aftermath of WWII. 
However, in spite of the analysis of foreign aid (or foreign assistance) being dogged by 
controversies and contradictions the concept used by most aid outlets is defined by the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD)  “as financial flows, technical assistance, and commodities that 
are (1) designed to promote economic development and welfare as their main objective (thus 
excluding aid for military or non-development purposed); and (2) are provided as either 
grants or subsidized loans” (Radelet, 2006:4). 
 
The DAC provides three broad categories which classify aid flow. Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) is the largest, which is composed of aid provided by donor governments to 
low-and middle income countries. Official Assistance (OA) and Private Voluntary Assistance 
(PVA) complete the categories. “Private voluntary assistance includes grants from non-
government organizations, religious groups, charities, foundations, and private companies” 
(Radelet, 2006:4).  ODA can be classified “into bilateral (given directly by a donor country) 
and multilateral (given to international institutions like the World Bank for distribution). In 
most studies on aid, it is bilateral ODA that is examined” (Lahiri, 2005:5). 
 
If aid is to be categorised as ODA, it has to meet three important criteria: 
• it has to be undertaken by official agencies; 
• it has to have the promotion of economic development as the main objective; and 
• It has to have a grant element of 25% or more (Lahiri, 2005:5). 
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As Japan has become a major donor of foreign aid especially in recent times, this study will 
focus on this trend.  In the case of Japan, foreign aid appears in different forms. “Japanese aid 
appears either as loans, grants, technical support and multilateral contributions” (Akiyama & 
Nakao, 2005:9). This study will focus on the four components. 
 
1.6  Research methodology 
The nature of this study is mostly exploratory and qualitative. The exploratory aspect is as a 
result of the unchartered character of the research topic. As stated by Ampiah (1997) this 
field of study is relatively new and as such, it will also take a qualitative approach which 
means  “by the term ‘qualitative research’ we mean any type of research that produces 
findings not arrived at by statistical procedures or other means of quantification” (Snape & 
Spencer, 2003:3). 
 
Though an explanation is provided above in how this study understands by what is meant by 
qualitative research, providing a precise definition is no easy task. However, as the existing 
literature attempts to provide working definition scholars do attempt to capture the 
characteristics of qualitative research. “In particular, there is fairly wide consensus that 
qualitative research is a naturalistic, interpretative approach concerned with understanding 
the meanings which people attach to phenomena (actions, decisions, beliefs, values etc.) with 
their social worlds” (Snape & Spencer, 2003:3). Some key points where there is also wide 
consensus regarding qualitative research which provides its distinctive character are as 
follows: aims at providing an in-depth and accurate understanding of the social world through 
the understanding of social and material conditions, providing information that is well 
researched, rich in data and far-reaching. Generally qualitative research emphasises the value 
of human beings to observe the social world and the ability to interpret and understand the 
phenomenon being studied. 
 
Qualitative research has got its advantages and its drawbacks. The advantage that this 
research method generates is that it provides in-depth and detailed body of work. Qualitative 
research by nature is deductive and therefore its contents are rich and extensive which can be 
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used to generate hypotheses. Other advantages are that qualitative research studies 
phenomena that are in its natural setting which as a result yield answers which are applicable 
to real life and generalisations are possible to similar phenomenon. The drawbacks regarding 
this research method is that unless similar phenomenon is observed generalisations are 
difficult to make. Qualitative research can be a time consuming process and therefore the 
study is often narrow. Finally, through this method the researcher is often heavily involved in 
the process which can lead to the researcher taking a subjective view regarding the data 
gathered and therefore can lead to a skew interpretation of the data. 
 
Since the aim is to feature - the evolution of the aid relationship with SSA and to highlight 
what has shaped it, a qualitative approach allows for a broad method procedure and for a 
diverse collection of data for a deeper understanding of Japan’s developing aid relationship 
with the continent. The emphasis, however, is not so much on gathering data about the factors 
involved, but providing an understanding of this aid relationship. As such, qualitative 
methodology is used since “the primary goal using this approach is defined as describing and 
understanding rather than explaining human behaviour” (Babbie & Mouton, 2001: 270). 
 
As the interest of this research lies in understanding and describing an evolutionary approach 
the method is also useful in that as the key feature is “its focus on process rather than 
outcome [with], the primary aim [being] in-depth descriptions and understanding of actions 
and events and the main concern is to understand social action in terms of specific context 
rather than attempting to generalize to some theoretical population” (Babbie & Mouton, 
2001: 270). Qualitative research is deemed appropriate in that it aims to be flexible about 
how and where data is gathered, and as there is no set procedure followed from the outset and 
the study will deal with the topic as it unfolds. 
 
This study uses both secondary and primary sources. Primary sources, such as official 
documents and speeches mostly originate from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 
(MOFA) and they deal with matters pertaining to Japanese-African relations. Japan’s ODA 
Annual Reports also feature as one of the primary sources. Both are seen as important for this 
study in that they provide data released by Japanese officials giving reasons for decisions 
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taken, declaring commitments they may have made, as well as some hard statistics. 
Secondary sources – most of the data used - will comprise academic journal articles, books, 
publications and media reports. 
 
1.7   Limitations and delimitations  
As this study focuses on the evolution of Japan’s aid relationship with Africa and the factors 
shaping it, the research will seek to provide an in-depth analysis of this topic to provide its 
rationale. The limitation is that the study does not attempt to make comparisons with other 
donor nations for any generalisations. Such generalisations are best suited for studies that 
seek to make comparisons.  
 
Japan is notably one of the major donor nations, outside the Western bloc, to have provided 
aid to SSA. As it offers a non-Western approach to development, it has assumed a position of 
great interest for scholars. The focus of this thesis, however, is not to compare Japan and the 
West on matters of development for the continent but rather to promote a greater 
understanding of Japan’s aid provision and to give attention to the factors which have, over 
time, been most evident in shaping this aid relationship. The rationales which will be the 
focus of this are the political, economic and moral factors.  
 
Apart from providing a historical perspective, the time-span covered by this thesis will be 
from the 1960s to contemporary times.  Although the links between Japan and SSA go 
beyond aid with the substantial economic, political and diplomatic factors the focus will be 
only on the aid relationship as the cornerstone of these links. 
 
1.8  Outline of remaining chapters 
The remaining five chapter of this study will be separated into chapter two, which provides 
the theoretical framework for this study as it undertakes to provide an IR theory background 
of foreign aid.  Chapter three covers a brief historical account of early Japanese-African 
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relations from the 1960s to early 1990s. This chapter also gives the background to past 
relations and sets the context for analyses made in the next chapter. 
 
Chapter four focuses on the period 1993-2003. It is essentially descriptive of the early stages 
of the relationship post-1990, as it reveals the foundations of the post-Cold War links 
between Japan and the continent and what role aid would play. This chapter goes some way 
to answer the question of why aid was so prominent in Japan’s ties with the continent and 
how this shaped the relationship. It brings clarity to the distribution and patterns of aid and 
the motivations behind this. It also provides the context for Japan’s decision to make aid 
available to the continent.  
 
Chapter five covers the 2004-2011 periods with a more in-depth description of patterns of aid 
distribution. The context of the unfolding trends and the motivations and objectives are 
explained. This helps to answer the question of how Japan’s aid relationship evolved with 
SSA and what factors have shaped it.  The focus is on Japanese initiatives for aid in SSA 
where aid is of utmost importance – and on measuring how the aid was instrumental in 
achieving successful returns on those initiatives. These processes and initiatives are essential 
to this study as they give clarity to Japan’s diplomacy on the continent. 
 
Chapter six provides the conclusion for this study.  It outlines the main findings and reflects 
on their implications in relation to relevant theoretical perspectives. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of areas for further research. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical framework 
 
2.1  Introduction 
The concept of foreign aid has been in existence for a considerable time, its motivation 
defined as assistance is given, by those who wish to provide aid as donors. But it was not 
until 1949 that it was first used as a tool of national policy. Pronk (2004), Black (1968), and 
Hattori (2003) are among those scholars who agree that it was after President Truman’s Point 
programme launched in 1949 that development assistance became part of foreign policy in 
the United States. “This made it the policy of the United States to aid the efforts of the 
economically underdeveloped areas to develop their resources and their living conditions. 
The launching of the programme is often considered the beginning of international 
development assistance” (Pronk, 2004:1). 
 
The rationale behind the provision of aid varies from state to state. However, from the time it 
was first used as a tool of national policies a number of factors have remained consistent 
across the donor community: the political, economics and moral reasons. However, while 
these three rationales are considered the mainstay for donor provision the moral rationale has 
largely been dismissed by some IR scholars. This chapter seeks to examine the basic 
rationales of foreign aid provision and review the theoretical perspectives of IR concerning 
aid. Then the literature will be assessed to find out which theoretical perspective has been 
considered the most significant. 
 
2.2 The rationale behind foreign aid 
The three main reasons for the provision of foreign aid which concern this study are the 
moral, political and economic rationales. They are generally the most conspicuous, although 
not the only reasons for aid determined by policies of the donor country. 
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2.2.1 The Moral Rationale 
The moral rationale for the provision of aid is that   “such assistance was a moral action that 
embodied a vision of international peace and prosperity” (Hattori, 2003:229). Although the 
ethical justification of foreign aid has been rejected by a number of IR scholars, aid remains a 
moral obligation for many donors either for basic humanitarian reasons or responsibility of 
former colonial powers to share resources for crimes committed under colonisation. 
Whatever the case, humanitarian aid remains the underlying basis of the moral school. The 
practice stems from the US aid programmes where assistance of others was seen to serve 
America’s best interests. “In the words of President Johnson ‘ the pages of history can be 
searched in vain for another power whose pursuit of that self-interest was so infused with 
grandeur of spirit and morality of purpose’” (Black, 1968:20). Hattori (2003) summarizes the 
moral dimension of foreign aid in the post-war era as the donations of states to multilateral 
grant-giving. 
 
2.2.2 The political rationale 
Black (1968:18) suggests that the basic, long-range goal of aid is political and “not economic 
development per se. The primary purpose of foreign aid is to supplement the efforts of the 
developing nations, to enhance their strength and stability and to defend their freedom” 
(Black, 1968:18). The political rationale for aid may vary according to donors, but it is often 
granted for political or strategic objectives. In some cases foreign aid can be seen as 
upholding and maintaining the status quo between two partners or that of the international 
system. Yet while ODA is designed to achieve political objectives it also is meant to increase 
prosperity in recipient countries. 
 
2.2.3 The economic rationale 
One of the most important reasons, put forward in the literature, for the provision of foreign 
aid is economic - specifically the promotion of economic development. As Black (1968) 
states, “the foreign aid programs of the U.S. and other donor  nations help to maintain the 
security of and the economic development of the less developed nations” (Black, 1968: 16-
17). 
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Such a view might explain the distribution of aid from developed to less developed countries 
but paradoxically it is also seen as insufficient to ensure full economic development. This 
implies that political implications are a more important rationale as Griffin points out: “the 
fact that the motive of foreign aid is political rather than economic does not necessarily   
imply that the consequence of aid is not beneficial to economic development” (Griffin, 
1991:649). Unlike a purely political rationale, an economic reason is not only about the 
interests of the donor as it is relevant to both the donor and recipient: by promoting trade and 
increasing the number of exchanges between the countries involved ensures long-term 
prosperity for both. 
 
2.3 International Relations (IR) and foreign aid 
In IR, the concept of foreign aid is explained from the vantage point of three theoretical 
perspectives. Firstly, the approach of political realism explains foreign aid as “a policy tool 
originated in the Cold War to influence the political judgements of recipients in a bi-polar 
struggle” (Hattori, 2001:634).  Hattori (2003) further highlights the dismissive position taken 
by scholars for the ethical justification of foreign aid. He asserts that during the Cold War 
political realists understood foreign aid to be a euphemism for strategic interests in these new 
African states as the threat of nuclear war shifted the competition between the superpowers to 
the Third World. 
 
As much as donor states might claim foreign aid to be voluntary, such foreign aid arises from 
material inequalities between the donor and the recipient. As Hattori 2001 points out: “for 
political realists, the material inequality between donor and recipient is embedded in a large 
political hierarchy determined by the bi-polar distribution of strategic capabilities during the 
Cold War” (Hattori, 2001:639). 
 
In using a political realist’s perspective, it can be argued that foreign aid has actively 
reinforced the underlying material inequality of that era. Political realism exposed the 
anarchy of an international world struggle (the Cold War) whereby security was essential for 
a state’s survival. In this system foreign aid reinforced the powerful by applying pressure on 
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the less powerful states to take a position for the own survival - thereby maintaining the 
material imbalance between the powerful and less powerful.  
 
The two alternative explanations of foreign aid are the perspectives of liberalism and the 
world system theory. Liberalism can also be referred to as idealism. The perspective differs 
from political realism which sees foreign aid as a policy tool to influence the political 
judgements of the recipients. Liberal internationalism, however, “is a set of programmatic 
measures designed to enhance the socio-economic and political development of recipient 
countries” (Hattori, 2001:634). The liberal position implicitly affirms the desire of recipients 
who strive for improvement and growth. Liberalists believe in the progress of human nature 
and foreign aid is the tool used to achieve and accelerate this progress at the international 
level. 
 
Like political realism, liberal internationalists understand that the condition from which 
foreign aid emerges is based on the material inequality between the donor country and the 
recipient. But they differ in that for liberalism “the gap between an advanced and less 
advanced condition of economic development will be mitigated over time by the expansion 
of international trade and finance” (Hattori, 200:639).  The difference for liberal 
internationalists is that foreign aid is primarily viewed as a policy tool to influence the 
material inequality of recipients, but it can also influence their political policies. 
 
There is an element of moral obligation for foreign aid in the liberal tradition. The literature 
suggests three ethical justifications. “The first identifies foreign aid as an ‘imperfect 
obligation’ of the industrialised to the less developed states to provide ‘basic needs’ which 
are identified as fundamental human rights. The second ethical justification for foreign aid is 
a moral response to problems that can be remedied with technical expertise. Finally, foreign 
aid is identified as embodying the ideal humanitarianism” (Hattori, 2003:230). There is, 
however, a suggestion that these ethical justifications are idealistic and that “aid cannot only 
be explained on the basis of economic and political interests of donors but that the 
significance of humanitarianism also influences the provision of aid” (Hattori, 2003:231). 
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Finally the world systems theory highlights foreign aid as “a means of constraining the 
development path of recipient’s countries, promoting the unequal accumulation of capital in 
the world” (Hattori, 2001:634). Later, Hattori (2003) elaborates more strongly that this 
perspective of foreign aid misinterprets an equally harsh reality of economic domination and 
exploitation of the core industrial states over the peripheral states. The world systems theory, 
however, emphasises that foreign aid contributes to the deterioration of the basic material 
inequality between donor and recipients. “For world system theorists, foreign aid is the 
operational factor behind the expansion of world capitalism, constraining the recipients’ 
development path to a dependent role in the world market” (Hattori, 2001:639). In other 
words foreign aid is seen as an impediment to the development of the recipients and 
contributes significantly in exacerbating the gap between the donor and recipient.  Foreign aid 
is deemed as the tool which reinforces a system which maintains the status quo. A system 
considered by world system theorists only serving a few nations the core, those nations which 
are wealthy and developed over the poor and underdeveloped nations. 
 
2.4 Realism in IR 
Realism has been selected for this study as the most appropriate IR perspective for a better 
understanding of Japan’s foreign aid to SSA. While there is no single school of thought in 
realism, they do share a number of important characteristics. Nicholson (1998:67-68) 
suggests five: firstly, the main actors in realism are states; secondly, the nature of the system 
in which states find themselves are anarchical; thirdly, the “power security” principle is the 
leading mode of interaction; fourthly, although for some states defensive security is a primary 
goal, other states will become predators and force concessions from a weaker power; lastly, 
internal politics and external politics are considered to be separate. 
 
Kenneth Waltz’s (Theory of International Politics, 1979) work has mostly been credited with 
having the most considerable impact in the neo-realism school of thought. According to this 
source anarchy defines the international system and states’ are compelled to secure security 
for their survival. Authors such as Buzan, Jones and Little (1993,) who have contributed to 
neo-realism thinking, provide essentially three points to show structural realism as an 
offshoot from the realist tradition. These are that:  
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• There is an emphasis on the dominance of the political sphere. 
• The state is still considered as the most important actor in the international system, 
though it remains essential not to disregard other actors also for the purpose of this 
paper.  
• The close link between actors and structures does not just only apply to the 
continuation between structural realism and realism traditions.  
 
Some discussion about Japan’s complex relationship with SSA using foreign aid as a tool is 
the next focus. One of the questions that this thesis addresses is motivated by how aid fulfils a 
role of appeasement in its relationship with Africa. The first argument for this approach is 
firstly that it was to ensure Japan’s economic survival. Secondly, after WWII policies were 
adjusted and so was the pattern of aid distribution during changes taking place in the 
international environment and in African states. The focus shifted more towards humanitarian 
needs and development assistance. 
 
Foreign aid has been a controversial issue throughout the industrialised world, and this has 
gained momentum in the post-Cold War era. The great conundrum has been about what role 
it ought to play and further, whether donor countries can continue to provide funds and what 
attachments there are to those funds. The realist paradigm helps shed light on Japan’s 
approach to the continent.  
 
Realists understand and assume that aid policies are driven essentially by the strategic 
interests of nation-states. Nations are firstly jostling for position in a Hobbesian sense. Under 
this condition it becomes imperative for states to reach a point of security and self-
preservation “as such foreign aid is perceived as only minimally related to recipient economic 
development and the humanitarian needs of recipient countries are downplayed. Neorealist 
however has underscored the equal if not greater importance of understanding the economic 
dimensions of national security” (Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, 1998:3). The difference occurs 
between classical realist and neo-realist in that “classical realist aid priorities are seen 
essentially driven by the political-military relevance of the recipient country whereas 
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neorealist emphasise the recipients’ economic potential in understanding the ever changing 
world” (Schraeder et al. 1998:3). 
 
Economic self-interest is widely regarded as the primary motivational factor of Japan’s 
foreign aid policies after WWII. The most noticeable aspect of Japan’s aid policy at this time 
was that “Japan clearly thought to use foreign aid in its quest for global economic supremacy. 
According to Stirling, Japan conducted a ‘business foreign policy’ in which overlapping 
groups of governmental and corporate actors have actively coordinated an ‘industrial policy’ 
targeted at enhancing exports through concessional aid” (Schraeder et al 1998:4). 
 
Scholars such as Scalapino point out that Japan was among the first nations to articulate its 
national interests and survival through economic initiatives. Schraeder et al. (1998) suggest 
that, in short, Japanese policy makers were able to pursue a neo-mercantilist foreign aid 
strategy that concentrated on securing Japan’s regional geo-economic interests while skirting 
any political entanglements. “This literature overwhelmingly supports the notion of economic 
self-interest (kokueki) as the key determinant of Japan’s foreign aid policies in the aftermath 
of the Second World War” (Schraeder et al. 1998:9). 
 
Nester (1991:31) concurs “that Japan’s neo-mercantilist strategy was also a major factor on 
Japan’s relationship and policy towards Africa”. Within the Cold War era, Japan sought to 
enhance its rapidly growing economy in search of economic supremacy. Relations with SSA 
were essential in achieving and maintaining the momentum and essential partners were 
sought across the continent to meet the needs of Japan’s economy. It is the economy which 
was deemed as vital to national security, as the US-Japan alliance provided Japan military 
protection which essentially left Japan to pursue its economic interests for its national 
security. 
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The focus on economic self-interests in foreign aid policies with the continent is also 
consistent with the apolitical nature of Japan’s foreign policies. Economics underscores 
Japan’s interests in SSA. According to Nester (1991) recipients of Japanese aid can be 
categorised as follows: 
• they are important sources of raw materials vital to Japanese industry; 
• they are potentially a source of materials in the future; 
• they are big economic markets able to absorb Japanese goods”.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided some insight into the basic motivations for aid provision using 
three widely practised theoretical perspectives. President Truman’s Point Programme of 1949 
launched a widely observed phenomenon which uses aid as a tool of national foreign policy. 
It was first launched to address economic underdevelopment of the developing world and 
improve living conditions.  The motivations for the provision of aid vary from state to state 
but they are consistent across the donor community as political, economic and moral 
rationales. 
 
As previously stated IR provides an explanation of foreign aid from three theoretical 
perspectives - political realism, liberalism, also known as idealism within the context of IR, 
and world system theory. All three theoretical perspectives provide conditions under which 
foreign aid addresses the challenges. This chapter’s conclusion is that political realism is 
considered the most appropriate theoretical perspective for this study for the role it has played 
in Japanese-SSAfrican aid relations. 
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Chapter 3: History of Japan-Africa relations and the emergence 
of Japanese ODA in Africa 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Several scholars including Ampiah (1997) and Sono (1993) provide in depth accounts of 
Japan’s relationship with Africa. Sono (1993) provides the most comprehensive account of 
Japanese-African relations which revisits the ties between the two partners from the earliest 
contacts in the 16th century. Relations have evolved since this time which has mostly been 
determined by consideration of European control over the continent. The end of WWII 
changed the direction of Japan for good and it was to emerge as one of the biggest and most 
powerful economies in the world by the end of the 20th century. Much of this transformation 
is owed to Japan’s increasingly close links to Africa. “Japan has emerged since the 1960s as 
an important trading partner and it became a relevant player in African political affairs during 
the 1980s” (Morikawa, 1997:1). 
 
The relationship between Japan and SSA is determined through number of factors: 
commercial trade, diplomacy, and aid. Aid has been the last to emerge in the development of 
links between these partners. Its emergence - as Japanese ODA – was first used to address 
Japan’s legacy and participation in the war.  “Historically, Japan’s ODA started as a form of 
war reparation to Asian neighbours. However, as the Asian countries started to graduate from 
ODA recipient, Japan was urged to shift its aid towards Africa as a last frontier of Japan’s 
ODA” (Motoki & Masumi, 2010: 3).  
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide firstly, the emergence of Japanese ODA in SSA, and 
secondly, to give an account of the historical relations between Japan and the continent. As 
ODA is Japan’s most recent policy link with SSA, its study is relatively new, particularly for 
the period from 1960 to 1990 which covers Japan’s vastly expanding relationship with the 
continent.  
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This chapter is separated into two sections: Section I provide an overview of Japanese-
African aid relations from 1960-1973.  Section II covers Japanese aid relationship towards 
SSA from 1974 until the early 1990s. The chapter concludes by discussing Japan’s 
relationship with South Africa. 
 
Section I: Japanese Aid and Political relations: 1960-1973 
3.2 The background of Japanese ODA to SSA 
ODA has been a strong component of Japan’s relationship with the world. The idea of 
development assistance was best understood by Japan after WWII when it needed to rebuild 
itself from the ruins of WWII and needed assistance to realise this objective. 
 
Japan assumed its role as an aid provider beyond its Asian neighbourhood as early as the 
1950s. In the 1950s, Japan’s role as a major donor to Africa grew when it became a member 
in the Colombo Plan which served to stimulate regional cooperation among members of 
British Commonwealth in Southeast Asia. The year 1954 “saw the very modest 
commencement of Japan’s ODA in the form of technical assistance when it joined the 
Colombo Plan of the British Commonwealth. Japan also started to provide aid to Asian 
countries that had resigned the claims on similar terms as reparations” (Watanabe, 2005:4). 
 
Japan’s economic progression has also contributed significantly to its aid policy particularly 
from the 1960s when aid was directed at generating economic benefits sustaining economic 
growth. “Accordingly, Japan’s ODA was often used for obtaining resources, trading market 
share, and inexpensive labour forces” (Watanabe, 2005:50). 
 
In the following decade the emergence of the global oil crisis of the 1970s and Japan’s rise as 
an economic force and ally of the West also propelled Japan to spread ODA across regions 
beyond her own. The trend would continue and would elevate Japan as a global donor leader 
to gain entry to the league of middle powers. This meant Japan at this time could inject a 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
29 
 
degree of influence in this region through its ODA programme without the prestige of being 
described as a superpower or great power.  It was at this period of the oil crisis of the 1970s 
where aid activities came in the shape of structural adjustment loans.  
 
Japan’s new status and shift in foreign policy served the country well as it became aligned 
with the members and standards of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). The political strategy also accelerated the move away from Japan’s 
obsession of acquiring resources to signalling the need to promote the path to democratisation 
in Africa. This was made clear with collapse of the Soviet Union and its communist ideology. 
 
The growth of Japanese aid is attributed to can be two factors by Cornelissen (2004:118) who 
states firstly, that Japan’s economic importance is attributed to US influence and 
subsequently contribute to international burden sharing and Japan used aid programmes as a 
response to the pressure applied by the US. Aid was used to attain middle-power status which 
increased rapidly with the country’s heightened activism.  
 
The era of the Cold War, however, cannot be understated in developing Japan’s foreign 
policy considerations in SSA. It is evident that during much of this era, Japan’s aid policy 
was wholly devoted to serving three objectives as Eyinla points:  “First to complement and 
reinforce America’s geo-strategic and ideological interests within the framework of the 
United States/Japan co-operative strategic aid policy. Second, it was used as an instrument 
for expanding export markets. Lastly, in the 1980s, aid became the most useful diplomatic 
instrument for placating the African states for their rising criticism against Japan for its 
position as the leading trading partner to apartheid South Africa” (Eyinla, 1999:413). 
 
The start of Japan’s aid relationship with SSA was motivated by economic reasons. Japan’s 
aid relationship with SSA had started primarily for economic reasons which were to serve 
Japan’s rapidly growing economy. ODA was delivered to SSA states rich in natural 
resources. This aid was, however, also intended to support Africa’s development as shown by 
Sato where “bilateral aid to African countries increased in ten years from 1970 to 1980 by 
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nominally 27.5 times. It is thus apparent that Japan embarked on aid to Africa primarily 
motivated by long-term economic security considerations” (Sato, 2005:73-74). 
 
In the course of the Cold War escalating in the decades of the 1950s, 60s, 70s and 80s, the 
realism perspectives remained ever present in Japan’s ODA in Africa. And as Japan’s 
responsibilities changed so did the political dynamics. The result of Japan’s increasing 
influence as a global economic power and the more active role she began to play 
internationally meant “Japan gradually came to see African countries as possible Japanese 
supporters in the international political scene, particularly at the UN meeting” (Sato, 
2005:74). 
 
These developments in the 1970s and 1980s can be considered political. African nations, 
breaking off the yoke of colonialism, were vulnerable to the pressure to take strategically 
important positions for the protagonists in the Cold War. In this political climate, Japan’s role 
to partner the United States and its allies resulted in economic might with which it assumed a 
position of a middle power.  
 
It appears, then, that all three rationales featured in Japan’s aid relationship with SSA in the 
period 1960-1973. Significant political, economic and moral motives emerged during the 
reparation experience in South East Asia; as a result Japan’s expanding post-war economy 
and international pressure to play a greater role in international affairs are significant factors 
for Japanese aid provisions to SSA.  
 
3.3 Japan’s aid diplomacy towards SSA (in the International context) 
This period 1960-1973 was crucial for Japan’s emerging aid policy towards the continent 
because Japan pursued a path of diplomacy with aid as its principal tool. The context is 
important to highlight; colonisation was ending on the continent but also there was growing 
repudiation of the apartheid system in South Africa. 
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Japan’s engagement with SSA during this period was informed to a large degree by Japan’s 
historical experiences and cultural practices, the latter which “have created specific but 
variable Japanese identities and interests over time. More often than not, Japan pursued ad 
hoc diplomacy in Africa even if this diplomacy sometimes boiled down to one of 
indifference” (Adem, 2009:3). 
 
Japan’s conflict resolution approach reveals the role that Japanese culture played in its aid 
diplomacy. “Japanese tradition of conflict resolution emphasizes the formula of ‘victor 
without vanquished’. Japanese believed, or gave the impression, that Apartheid could not be 
brought to an end just by isolating the regime. As it continued trade with South Africa, Japan 
had also continued in cultivating better relations with the rest of Africa” (Adem, 2009:3). It 
was as a result of this diplomatic behaviour that African nations began to voice their 
displeasure at Japan attempting to play both sides of the conflict. On the part of Japan such 
behaviour was a form of cultural logic as much as it was to achieve its objectives.  
 
Japan’s diplomacy throughout this period towards SSA established a number of goals. 
According to van Wyk, (2007:16-17) “Japan’s main diplomatic goals were to promote its 
prosperity, to ensure the country’s security and to become the world’s leading economic 
power. Thus, it can be argued that Japan’s earlier ties with Africa were much more based on 
economic interests than any political gains or influence on the continent”. 
 
Furthermore, Japanese diplomacy in this period served to meet a number of strategic 
objectives. “Since the 1960s the diplomatic objectives of Japan in Africa have changed 
periodically – but the changes were never – clear cut. In other words, the pursuit of strategic, 
economic and political objectives has remained the pillars of Japan’s diplomacy in Africa. 
However, the emphases have changed from time to time” (Adem, 2009:5). 
 
Japan’s engagement with the continent was balanced by the global political context at the 
time. Japan’s ambition of becoming an economic power was at its earliest phase. Crucially in 
this period, Japan had to contend with a number of issues on the international stage which 
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had significant ramifications for Japan’s diplomacy in SSA. This included the “Cuban missile 
crisis (1962), the Vietnam War (1965), and the ‘Nixon shock’ (1971). It must be noted that 
the suggestion here is not that Japan completely disregarded its economic interests during this 
period. This phase reflected a diplomatic orientation to support the West in curbing the 
spread of communism in Africa. The major diplomatic objective of Japan was to help 
entrench African countries in the Western camp” (Adem, 2009:5-6).  
 
Japan’s aid diplomacy at this time was all about balancing its economic ambitions and its 
responsibilities as an ally of the West in the bi-polar world struggle of the Cold War. As 
suggested by Adem (see quote above), aid relations with the continent were weighted a great 
deal towards the political rationale because it was directed at curbing communism on the 
continent when colonisation was drawing to an end. However, the importance of economic 
motivations should not be underestimated as the rationale was more about Japan’s economy 
than SSA renewal. 
 
3.4 Historical Overview of Japanese/SSA relations 
The rationale behind the relationship between Japan and SSA has mostly been understood in 
economic terms. It is after all the oldest motivation for the link between the island nation and 
the continent. This relationship has often been termed asymmetric where “Japan wants 
Africa’s raw materials; Africa needs Japan’s market, economic aid and investment, the 
asymmetric nature of interdependence between the two is not only there for all to see but the 
gap is also widening considerably” (Adem, 2001). The relationship from the outset has 
favoured Japan greatly and continues to widen. 
 
Japan has since the end of the 19th century (at the time the African continent was being 
partitioned) explored new markets on the continent which in many ways provided 
strategically important resources for their hungry growing economy. The economic 
relationship between the two was not acknowledged until the 1930s, where “the term 
‘economic diplomacy’ was first used within government documents and the Japanese media 
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to describe the process by which Japan wanted to gain greater access to European dominated 
markets in Africa” (van Wyk, 2007:17). 
 
It was not until the 1960s when Japan/SSAfrican relations began to accelerate, that Japan had 
to confront a number of perplexing issues which had enormous ramifications for its economic 
links with Africa. A pattern of dealing with the continent developed at this time. Japan had to 
address its close economic ties with South Africa which had, generated criticism – especially 
from African states. A dual diplomacy emerged, whereby the importance of securing 
resources of national importance, and the issues that threatened this resulted in the 
establishment of Japan’s ‘Black Africa’ policy and ‘White Africa’ policy.  Japan’s most 
important commercial partner on the continent was South Africa and although the 
relationship was plagued with difficulties, it never deterred both countries from having close 
commercial relations. In spite of UN sanctions placed against South Africa for its apartheid 
policy, economically its trade with Japan remained healthy, as Morikawa notes, “in 1962 the 
total value of Japanese-South Africa trade amounted to $ 178, 974, 000 , in 1968 it $ 551, 
591, 000, and by 1980 it had climbed to $ 3, 593, 738, 000. This represents a twenty fold 
increase in less than 20 years” (Morikawa, 1984:134).  
 
The 1960s saw Japan begin to form its own identity on the continent. Its dual diplomacy was 
heavily influenced by its internal need to expand its economy and play a more significant role 
for its allied partners during the Cold War. On the African continent white minority regimes, 
particularly South Africa was an ally of the West in the anti-Communist bloc. Another 
consideration was that South Africa provided strategically important resources for Japan as 
Owoeye notes,  “South Africa has the world’s largest known deposits of the four key 
minerals – uranium, manganese, vanadium and platinum – groups metals and therefore in 
terms of sources of supply, South Africa is strategically more important to Japan than any 
other African country” (Owoeye, 1984: 284-285).  It is for this reason that Japan had to build 
strong links with the region and therefore show a measure of support for the apartheid 
government at the time. 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
34 
 
The ever growing close links between the island nation and Africa was broadened further by 
the growth in foreign aid. In a time where securing resources was of great importance, aid 
was seen as a way as to ensure resources for its economy. This led to Japan distributing aid to 
countries which were largely of strategic value, as Nester (1991) argues: “Japanese aid is 
targeted toward countries in which it has extensive economic interests where the main 
recipients of aid have either large markets or natural resources, although considerable aid has 
flowed to Tanzania because of ex-President Nyerere’s diplomatic prestige” (Nester, 1991). 
 
Aid had successfully worked for Japan as war reparations to its Asian-neighbours. Its use 
towards SSAfrican nations in the initial stage had much to do with its own domestic 
objectives as it did with its alliance with Western powers, particularly the US. This means 
that both economic and political rationales were in effect at this time. Once again, it appears 
economic motives were important as to ensure resources for its own economy and directed to 
countries with large markets on the continent. Politically, aid was directed to SSA to curb the 
spread of communism and thereby contributing and assisting its Western allies. 
 
Japan’s establishment of its geo-economic interests with aid disbursement created a dilemma 
for the recipients as it implied an inherent dependency and this brought about some difficult 
political problems. “In fact  Japan’s first aid to Africa followed after Nigeria’s decision in 
August 1963 to restrict Japanese imports while Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda threatened to do 
the same” (Nester, 1991). The restrictions in imposed by Nigeria were intended to direct 
Tokyo not to extract resources out of the country without any meaningful returns to Nigeria 
and other African countries particularly through long-term investment. However, Japan found 
long-term investment a problem in Africa. Japanese business cited many reasons why it held 
such a pessimistic view regarding investment in the region “in order of importance, political 
instability, and difficulties in raising capital, poor quality of labor, economic instability, and 
difficulties in collecting information. Other difficulties cited include poor transportation and 
communications infrastructure, government corruption, inefficiency and red tape, and fears 
that Africans simply perceived the Japanese as "economic animals” (Nester, 1991). It was in 
this context that restrictions were introduced by African states on Japanese imports where in 
return Japan first began to address its problems and promote its interests on the continent 
through aid. 
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The evolution of Japan’s aid policy coincided with the increase in power and the economic 
might of Japan. The relationship between Japan and SSA which initially was dictated by the 
West has changed and thereby the use of aid has subsequently changed.  The change in the 
nature of this relationship has led to Japan become a significant contributor of foreign aid and 
as such seen Japan become the lead donor country. By the 1980s Japan was providing its 
most industrious ODA work to date – which was again accelerated in this decade to secure 
natural resources in naturally endowed regions of the world. By the end of the Cold War in 
1989/90, Japan had emerged as the world’s leading ODA donor.  “Japanese leaders also 
pledged to become better ‘aid citizens’ by not only supporting economic development, but 
also social and political reforms in developing countries, including African countries. This 
was a significant foreign policy strategy of Japan to accentuate itself as an emerging 
middlepower” (van Wyk, 2007:31). The role of aid remains enormously relevant in Japan’s 
foreign policy which at its core follows the basic principles of global diplomatic pacifism and 
international cooperation.  
 
Section II: Japanese Aid and Political relations: 1974-1990 
3.5 Japan’s aid diplomacy towards SSA (1974-1990) 
This period of Japan/SSA relations should be studied with knowledge of Japan’s basic 
objectives of its diplomacy. These can be discerned from official sources. As stated in the 
Diplomatic Bluebook of 1974: “In order to secure its own peace and progress, Japan must 
promote the maintenance and strengthening of international peace, stability and cooperation. 
The need is for, Japan to conduct an active multilateral diplomacy on a global scale through 
cooperation and dialogue. In conducting such a multilateral diplomacy, it is first of all 
fundamentally important for Japan to maintain and develop its traditional relations of 
friendship” (Diplomatic Blue Book, 1974).  
 
The Diplomatic Bluebook also highlights the importance for Japan’s need to develop 
relations beyond its neighbourhood. “Japan also needs to pursue mutual understanding and 
cooperation with other regions of the world, such as Africa and Central and South America, 
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from the standpoint of promoting broadly-ranged international cooperation” (Diplomatic 
Blue Book, 1974). 
 
The relationship between Japan and SSA at this time reached an important milestone. 
Foreign Minister Kimura visited five African countries of Ghana, Nigeria, Zaire, 
Tanzania and Egypt late in October through November, an epoch-making event. The 
first official visit to Africa by a Japanese Foreign Minister in office was timely because 
it took place at a time when the problem of Portuguese colonies was drawing to an end 
and shortly before the Lusaka Conference, which marked a shift in South Africa's 
position to one of easing tensions. The exchange of views at a high level meeting with 
the leaders of the host countries greatly promoted mutual understanding between Japan 
and Africa. 
 
As a result of the exchanges taken place with the Prime Minister’s tour (1974), Japan 
took a series of concrete steps as mentioned below to substantiate its position. 
• Japan decided not to conduct exchanges with South Africa in accordance with 
the relevant United Nations resolutions. 
• Japan continued to strengthen its cooperation in the economic and social 
development of African countries. 
• In connection with international relief activities, Japan contributed 500 million 
to the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization. The Japanese aid was highly 
appreciated by the African countries concerned and it helped improve the image 
of Japan among the African nations” (Diplomatic Blue Book, 1974).  
Japan’s presence on the continent since this time and through this exchange has 
increased. Economic factors were the primary motivation for the increased presence 
especially after the oil crisis of 1973 which prompted Japan to search for secure 
resources but political factors should not be overlooked. 
 
The tours to Africa were significant in that they were the first of their kind and a 
number of countries were targeted for the visit. Toshio Kimura visited a number of 
countries and explained later how the ‘oil shock’ of (1973) “forced him to recognise the 
vulnerability of the Japanese economy and to consider the need for a wider approach to 
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international relations. After the second ‘oil shock’ of 1979, Toshio Kimura’s successor 
Naoshi Sonoda visited Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Senegal in West Africa and Tanzania and 
Kenya in East Africa. Whatever the reasons, Japanese ODA to Africa multiplied by 
2,3% between 1973 and 1984; already by 1981, Africa’s share of Japanese ODA had 
increased to 9,3%” (Seddon & Sato, 1997:155). 
 
The tour to Africa in 1974 by Toshio Kimura held a number of objectives. “Kimura primarily 
used the visits to announce Tokyo’s doubling of its African aid that year to 5,2% of its total 
aid. Japanese aid is targeted toward countries in which it has extensive economic interests. 
The main recipients have either large markets or natural resources, although considerable aid 
has flowed to Tanzania because of ex-President Nyerere’s diplomatic prestige” (Nester, 
1991). 
 
The situation in SSA in 1974 saw significant change evolving around the long-standing 
question of southern Africa. Two important documents can attest to the changing 
circumstance in this region. The Lusaka and Nkomati Accords both had the intention of 
addressing the unstable situation the region found itself in at the time. South Africa entered 
these two agreements with both Mozambique and Angola in 1984. “The Nkomati accord 
pledged Mozambique to expel the ANC, from its territory and to work in conjunction with 
South Africa to this end” (Price, 1985:534). South Africa in exchange pledged to stop its 
support for the Mozambique National Resistance which challenged the government of the 
time. 
 
The Lusaka accords on the other hand “commits the government of Angola to preventing the 
South-West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) from using its territory as a base for 
attacks into South African controlled Namibia” (Price, 1985:534).  In exchange for this South 
Africa agreed to remove its forces in Angola. In the meantime, Japan's diplomacy towards 
SSA made great progress and it can be said that its relationship with SSA entered a new era. 
Japan from this time increased visibility on the continent especially after the first tour by a 
Japanese foreign minister in 1974. 
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Overall this period suggest that economic and political rationales were at play throughout this 
process. The tour on the part of Japanese officials led directly to increase of ODA, directed 
particularly to countries which it had extensive economic interests. Politically the anti-
communism momentum was in full swing and also for Japan, it was important to pursue its 
appeasement strategy on the continent in the wake of widespread criticism directed against it 
by African nations for its perceived close relations with apartheid South Africa. Once more 
Japan at this time continues to play a balancing act between economics and political interests. 
 
3.6 Pre-1990 Japan ODA disbursement to SSA 
Japan’s aid policy has evolved over time as a result of its foreign policy which has undergone 
change. Japanese aid or articulated as ODA “has been one of Japan’s primary foreign policy 
tools since its rapid economic development in the early 1950s had been economic assistance, 
ODA. There are three determinants of Japanese ODA which are mercantilist factors, 
humanitarian reason and U.S. motivated” (Tuman, Strand & Emmert, 2009:220).  
 
The first period (1960-1973) formed part of Japanese aid policy to Africa. The second stage 
of Japan’s aid diplomacy to Africa falls under the second period (1974-1990). The motivation 
for Japan at this time through its aid policy towards the continent was shaped considerably by 
economic interests. At this time Japan also began to see SSA as an important ally especially 
through multilateral institutions. Japanese Foreign Affairs has worked hard to gain trust of 
SSA which in time may be crucial in Japan’s future international ambitions. For Japan the 
difference in these two stages “is that in the former Japanese aid was motivated by economic 
security considerations, and its prime target was the recipient countries. In the latter stages, 
the Japanese prime target was fewer recipients than other donors who demanded Japan to 
increase its financial contribution to international development” (Sato, 2005:74).  
 
The overall picture concerning ODA disbursement to Africa suggests a steady incline from 
the 1960s to 1990 though there were exceptions to the steady incline of disbursements. Table 
3.1 highlights this trend: 
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Table 3.1: 
Japan’s Bilateral ODA to SSA, 1969-1990 
(Net disbursement) 
Year ODA TO SSA (US $ 
million) 
SSA Share of Total 
Japanese ODA (%) 
1969 4 1,1 
1970 8 2,2 
1971 13 2,9 
1972 5 1,0 
1973 18 2,4 
1974 36 4,1 
1975 59 6,9 
1976 46 6,1 
1977 56 6,3 
1978 105 6,9 
1979 187 9,7 
1980 223 11,4 
1981 211 9,3 
1982 268 11,3 
1983 261 10,8 
1984 212 8,7 
1985 252 9,9 
1986 418 10,9 
1987 518 9,9 
1988 884 13,4 
1989 1,040 15,3 
1990 792 11,4 
Source: Cornelissen, 1997:42 
Overall, Japan’s disbursement performance in the pre-1990 period reflects Japan’s diplomacy 
of the time. The performance of Japanese ODA must also be understood against the 
objectives of its aid policy to SSA. “First, it served the strategic and ideological interests of 
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the United States. Countries that were important in terms of countering the spread of 
communism and the influence of the Soviet Union were recipients of ODA. Second, Japan’s 
aid policy was aimed at securing resources and expanding its export markets” (Nel, 2005:6-
7).  
 
The final objective served Japan outside the Japan/America alliance. It sought to address 
Japan’s increasing criticism for its relationship with apartheid South Africa. Japan’s approach 
as a result distributed aid to a finite number of countries. “Between 1960 and 1990 eight 
countries shared more than 70 per cent of total aid to Africa. The countries were Kenya, 
Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Zaire and Zambia. Countries such as Kenya, 
Tanzania and Zambia continued to be major recipients of Japanese aid through the 1990s” 
(Nel, 2005:6-7). The pre-1990 aid distribution from Japan to Africa has two primary 
motivations that of economics and politics.  
 
3.7 Japanese aid and South Africa: 1960-1993 
As a whole South Africa and its neighbours presented Japan with both pleasure and pain 
throughout this period. On the one hand, economics and commercial trade between the two 
partners had many advantages: natural resources for Japan in a time of global uncertainty, 
and for South Africa, Japan provided a market to sell those resources. On the other hand, the 
political and diplomatic difficulties deprived a sustainable healthy relationship between the 
partners. South Africa was a problematic partner to have at the time because of its status as a 
“pariah state” whose domestic policy was increasingly becoming repugnant across the world. 
In spite of South Africa whose reputation was deeply tarnished at the time, it remained 
important to Japan - as reflected by the trade numbers of a twenty-fold increase from the 
1960s to end of 1980s. 
 
South Africa and its close neighbours were of great importance to Japan in comparison to the 
rest of the continent. The reasons for this are: 
(1) Southern Africa was diplomatically important in demonstrating Japan’s opposition to 
apartheid in the Republic of South Africa; 
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 (2) some countries were suitable for ODA activities in term of others considerations 
• security (Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana), 
• friendliness to Japan (especially Zambia), and 
• language (for most Japanese, English is the best foreign language in which to 
communicate)” (Motoki & Taichi, 1999:71).  
The pattern of aid, after majority rule was achieved in in the region, was granted no longer as 
a traditional political gesture but for humanitarian purposes. The relationships between Japan 
and the region were, however, influenced by Japan’s relationship with the Republic of South 
Africa which, as has been shown, was a troubled one. 
 
Any form of exchange - particularly that of aid to not only South Africa but also the SSA 
region - was bound to be shaped considerably by Japan’s stance towards South Africa. 
Motoki and Taichi explain:  “Japan formally declared itself against apartheid and supported 
the UN sanction policy. Due to the relatively strong economic relationship between South 
Africa and Japan, however, Japan was somewhat ambivalent. In 1987, Japan became the top 
trader with the racist South African government. To neutralize this impression, Japan resorted 
to reinforcing ODA leaders of frontline states, namely Zambia and Tanzania” (Motoki & 
Taichi, 1999:72). 
 
In terms of the patterns of ODA, it differed when directed to South Africa compared to the 
region and the continent at large. When it came to South Africa it is clearly evident that the 
flow of ODA from Japan during this time was non-existent. Strong commercial links, 
criticism of apartheid, and political and diplomatic ties are some of the factors that have 
influenced relations between the two partners. The most noticeable aspect of this relationship 
with South Africa at the start was the lack of ODA. This arose from Japan’s historical 
understanding and relationship with South Africa – rationale that Morikawa outlines as 
follows: “The Republic of South Africa is not covered by Japan’s ODA policies. This is 
because the Japanese bureaucrats concerned have historically treated South Africa as being a 
developed nation, notwithstanding that it was a country that legalized racial discrimination. 
Another reason is that Japan has in the case of South Africa had the benefit of large-scale 
stable trade, direct private investment and technology transfers” (Morikawa, 2005:493).  
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As Japan’s aid provision to SSA is based on political, economic and moral rationales, it is 
particularly noticeable that the moral rationale given for the aid which flowed to South Africa 
at this time was directed to previously disadvantaged groups - a humanitarian motive. 
Previously, Japan had not deemed South Africa suitable for aid as it regarded South Africa as 
a developed nation. 
 
The initial lack of ODA given to South Africa from Japan cannot be understated. Its 
commercial links largely flattered South Africa’s status in the eyes of Japanese bureaucrats 
who saw tremendous benefits from this relationship.  Morikawa explains “according to the 
Japanese governments ‘Diplomatic Blue Book’, Tokyo and Pretoria announced on 1 March 
1961 that they agreed to establish diplomatic relations and would implement them as soon as 
the necessary internal procedures on both sides could be concluded” (Morikawa, 1984:133). 
 
This agreement on March 1961 would begin Japan’s most controversial period post-WWII. 
ODA featured infrequently in this relationship with South Africa but the limited ODA which 
was provided was no different in its objectives as it was to some of the other recipients on the 
continent in that it was not based on humanitarian needs (which it became at the end of this 
period) but rather political needs - to prolong the arrangements with Pretoria. It was the 
foundation of what is termed as Japans ‘White Africa’ policy because “the place of South 
Africa in this overall picture was different. It was given high priority in Japan’s foreign 
policy as it was regarded as a self-proclaimed champion of the anti-communist struggle in 
Africa and maintained an intimate relationship with the United States” (Morikawa, 1997:9-
10). 
 
Throughout this period, aid had served Japan’s political and economic objectives of securing 
resources, appeasing significant voices on the continent, behaving in accordance with UN 
resolutions and ensuring Japan’s own economic survival. However, the aid directed to South 
Africa – was based on Japanese bureaucrats understanding of the country. “It regarded South 
Africa despite having a black majority and a policy of apartheid as an advanced free-world 
country on par with Australia or Canada” (Morikawa, 1997:9) and was therefore not regarded 
as an aid recipient.  
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South Africa was deemed to be a developed nation which was believed not to be in need of 
aid. The commercial links cannot be said to have provided the buffer that distracted Japan 
ODA away from the magnitude of the problems underway in the Republic. Aid of any 
significance from Japan arrived after majority rule was achieved. The aid granted moved 
away from the traditional political gesture to that of humanitarian need. This alteration from 
the start of the 1990s was significant. “From 1990, Japan began to provide aid to anti-
apartheid groups in South Africa through international NGO’s and other organisations. After 
the inauguration of the ANC government in 1994, Japan pledged a large aid package” (Sato, 
2005:155-156). The move on the part of Japan to distribute aid to South Africa post-1994 
suggests the importance South Africa is to Japan on the continent. With the fall of the 
apartheid regime, aid to South Africa served a different role, to secure Japan’s most important 
relationship on the continent which would provide the foundation for it to pursue its interests 
on the continent. For Japan, aid to South Africa meant that a strong primarily economic and 
political relationship is established as South Africa was considered at the time the gateway 
into the continent.    
 
3.8 Conclusion 
Chapter 3 has given some insight into Japan-African contacts and relations that span over 
centuries. Japanese interests on the continent accelerated at the time of Africa’s partitioning 
where Africa was deemed to have an endless reservoir of resources and a potentially lucrative 
market for Japan and the West. It was only until the 1960s where Japan began to establish 
strong links with the continent. The Cold War and the anti-Communist struggle, a fast 
growing Japanese economy, securing resources of national security are some of the reasons 
for Japan’s new interest on the continent. 
 
Japanese foreign aid policy evolved over time and the relationship with SSA has experienced 
this change. ODA became a part of Japan’s foreign policy and began in earnest at a time 
when Japan held large commercial relations with South Africa who at the time was its most 
important partner on the continent.  The two rationales that dominate Japan’s aid relationship 
at this time are economic and political. Both were of great importance to Japan’s SSA and 
international relations. One can conclude that ODA as a form of realpolitik was vital to 
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secure interests for its own national security. In closing South Africa was of great importance 
to Japan and ODA featured less prominently in this country as a result of strong commercial 
links and how Japan perceived South Africa at the time as a developed nation. 
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Chapter 4: Japanese aid towards Africa: patterns and motives 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In recent times, ODA has received much attention in Japanese foreign policy. Since ODA’s 
early introduction, particularly to the African continent, the intended use was not explicitly 
articulated, reflecting Japans ad hoc foreign policy. However, the post-1990 period presented 
new circumstances in which Japan was pressed to revisit its foreign policy engagements. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin brought this change, not only to Japan 
but to many of the world’s powers. For Japan, this subsequently led a new interest in Africa 
and Japanese aid began to feature prominently in Japan’s diplomacy on the continent. The 
shift can be traced by analysing the flow and pattern of Japanese aid to Africa.  
 
In this chapter the primary question addressed is:  Why did the continent receive aid from 
Japan? The literature indicates that since the 1950s, aid which first began as a diplomatic tool 
in Japan’s foreign policy, significantly increased in the late 1970s and 1980s in SSA. The 
increase in aid can be attributed to greater visibility of Japan on the continent especially after 
the first foreign visit by a Japanese minister to the continent in 1974. By the post-1990 era, 
however, aid had become more important as a pillar in Japan’s diplomacy towards Africa. 
This chapter and the one that follows aim to shed light on this change. The key feature to be 
discussed is how and why, since the early 1990s, the ODA Charter became the fulcrum of 
Japanese diplomatic relations. In Africa, Japan promotes a different form of development to 
the Western model which means that considerable attention has been given to promote self-
help efforts and a self-ownership for Africans in their own development. Like the West, 
however, the policy also aims to promote peace and stability on the continent. Clearly in 
considering all these factors, Japan’s intention has been to distinguish itself on the 
international scene and on the African continent. 
 
Without a colonial past with the continent, Japan’s engagement with SSA is such that it is 
strategically well placed to pursue different political aims. These unique features will be the 
focus of chapter four and chapter five in which the Tokyo International Conference on 
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African Development (TICAD) process and G8 Summits will be analysed to assess Japan’s 
foreign aid objectives. This chapter begins with the first decade of the TICAD Process as well 
as the G8 Summits insofar as it concerns Japanese/SSAfrican aid relations.  
 
Chapter five studies the second decade of the TICAD process and the challenges confronting 
this process. The arrival of China on the continent and the implications this may have on 
Japan’s aid relationship with SSA will also be discussed. Finally, Japan’s aid relationship 
with South Africa is examined. 
 
4.2 Post-1990 Japanese ODA policy to Africa 
4.2.1 Background 
According to Sunaga (2004) “Japan’s post-1990 foreign policy was deeply influenced by the 
international context of the time and also the domestic climate where a balance had to be 
found between these two factors”.  We have seen that the geopolitical circumstances affecting 
Japan’s policy outlook of the late 1980s at the Cold War brought about Japan’s advancement 
as a major economic power.  Japan’s new path on the international stage began one in which 
its foreign policy was to promote “peace, freedom and prosperity as common objectives that 
Japan should pursue    together with people of other  nations” (MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook: 
1992). Clearly from the outset strong political reasons were given to promote Japan’s foreign 
policy. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc Sunaga notes “with this development, states 
particularly those highly involved in the “conflict” had to reconsider their aid policies, since 
at the time a great deal went to Third World countries” (Sunaga, 2004:1). 
 
From 1990 Japan’s ODA gained considerable attention as first clear indication of what 
Japanese foreign policy intended in the post-Cold war era. While ODA dispersed by Japan is 
no different to that of other donor nations, primarily on an inter-government basis the ODA 
report of that year reveals three other significant roles for aid in Japan’s international 
relations. 
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• “First, Japanese aid plays an important role in the maintenance and promotion of 
friendly and cooperative bilateral relationships between Japan and recipients of its aid. 
In other words, aid is a component of Japanese foreign policy. 
• Secondly, Japanese aid is substantially influenced by trends in the international 
political situation. 
• Third, by using its economic strength to foster international stability and prosperity, 
Japan can make a major contribution to the international community” (ODA Annual 
Report, 1990). 
  
At that time exchanges between individuals and between states were at an unprecedented 
high level due to better and quicker methods of interaction especially in information 
technology and more person to person exchanges. However, these exchanges also 
exacerbated the gap between rich and poor, and wealthy nations were pressed to play a 
greater role in bridging this gap. In 1992, Japan, as one of the wealthy nations, was intent on 
reducing this gap and it was within this context that ODA Charter was drawn up.  As stated 
the significance of studying aid in Japanese diplomacy is that it is important to distinguish it 
from the traditional economic and commercial motives. In fact, aid has become an incredibly 
complex factor in the study of any foreign policy and for Japan it is no different. 
 
 4.3 Japan’s political mark on the African continent 
The flow of aid to the continent attracted a great deal of interest in terms of its implications. 
Japan’s first major commitment was as a result of humanitarian considerations in 
Mozambique.  As Sato notes, “In 1993 the Japanese sent  the SDF [Self-Defense Forces]  to 
Mozambique for participating in the UN peace-keeping operation after the ceasefire between 
the Frelimo government and the RENAMO forces backed up by Apartheid South Africa” 
(Sato, 2005:76). 
 
The second political commitment was the Tokyo International Conference on African 
Development (TICAD) process. Japan’s post-1990 relationship with SSA is largely expressed 
through TICAD, which has become one of two key pillars of Japan’s relationship with 
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Africa; the other being Japan-South Africa relations. Both commitments reflect a political 
rationale aimed at bringing about a level of stability in the region at a time of global political 
change. 
 
The establishment of TICAD in 1992 demonstrates Japan’s new found energy towards SSA 
as the instigation of this international conference with various stakeholders in African 
development was to develop new goals. Lehman (2005) gives three reasons for Japan’s 
decision to hold this conference. “Japan clearly saw the humanitarian need in Africa and, 
given Japan’s economic wealth; it realized it could create a positive environment. Second, 
Japan desired to be treated as a major global power and as a latecomer in providing aid to 
Africa, Japan needed a strong presence on the continent to present itself as a leading donor 
country” (Lehman, 2005:427).  
 
Lehman’s further point relates to Japan’s past experience in Asia which motivated the aid 
relationship with Africa. He elaborates that “part of its strategic plan to position itself as a 
major Asian power, Japan used TICAD as a platform to put forward the so-called Asian 
development model” (Lehman, 2005:427).   Japan’s aid provision to the continent was 
heavily motivated by politics. Aid distribution to Africa at this time would serve Japan’s 
political ambition to be recognised as a major political power.  
 
The TICAD framework was different to other international frameworks in that it encouraged 
mutual interaction between members. The importance of this political commitment for Japan 
was that it allowed for the initiation of a development strategy in Africa for Africa. The 
following TICAD conference, held five years later in 1998, continued on the platform 
established by the first conference by providing new developmental initiatives. What can be 
seen in TICAD I, was that the whole process was more of a  symbolic manoeuvre by all 
stakeholders as there were no established mechanisms to monitor the actualisation of the 
established targets.  Lehman defines “the first TICAD conference as marking Japan’s interest 
in claiming its role and increasing its visibility in Africa. Japan’s criticism of conventional 
structural adjustment policies and neo-liberalism emerged at this time. These criticisms led to 
the promotion of Japan’s own ‘Asia model development’” (Lehman, 2005:429-430). 
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The United Nations has been a co-organiser alongside Japan since the inception of the 
TICAD process which aimed to promote ownership on the part of African states concerning 
their own development path, with support of the international community. Gambari notes that 
the process has also allowed “for a forum where exchanges concerning development 
strategies are discussed between the continent and developmental partners with the goal at 
contributing to poverty alleviation by means of economic growth” (Gambari, 2003:1). 
 
TICAD has identified a number of objectives: the three pillars that comprise Japan's initiative 
for assistance to Africa. They are “human-centered development”, “poverty reduction 
through economic growth” and “consolidation of peace” as outlined by Japan’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA, 2003:116). These pillars also correspond to the priority 
areas laid out by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). 
 
The first two TICAD processes instigated some new developments: firstly, it meant that the 
continent remained on the international agenda. This can be attributed to Japan being at the 
heart of the creation of the process in 1992 “involving the donor community and non-
governmental organisations” (Lehman, 2005:427). Secondly, the process was also successful 
in highlighting the need for development in SSA, where Japan has crucially highlighted this 
point internationally. However, Japan’s commitment in the first two TICAD have raised 
questions about many objectives established through the TICAD process lacked substance 
and commitment in terms of what Japan is willing to contribute and how these contributions 
would be measured and monitored. There was also the question about the true intentions of 
Japan:  Was it really committed to SSAfrican development, or is it committed as far as it is 
beneficial to the island nation? On the whole TICAD was about creating an environment 
suitable to address the development challenges on the continent. As such, it can be said the 
economic rationale was also significant in getting this process underway. 
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4.4 Post-1990 ODA data for SSA 
Japan’s post-1990 ODA programme is remarkable. The most significant period is post-
TICAD I from 1990-1998 which reveals a proactive stance and increased visibility for Japan 
in SSA. In terms of volume, the ODA programme in this period reflects Japan’s initiative and 
enthusiasm to support development in Africa (see Table 4.1).  
 
Table 4.1: Japan’s bilateral ODA to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 1990-1998 
(Net disbursement) 
Year ODA Total 
(US $ million) 
SSA’s Share of 
Total Japanese 
ODA (%) 
1990 792 11,4 
1991 910 10,3 
1992 858,81 10,1 
1993 966 11,8 
1994 1144 11,8 
1995 1332,93 12,6 
1996 1067 12,8 
1997 803 12,1 
1998 950 11,0 
Cumulative 
Total (1990-
1998) 
8823,74  
Sources: ODA Annual Reports, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999. 
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Japan’s ODA after TICAD I was significant for many reasons. Quantitatively, SSAfrica’s 
share of total Japanese ODA remained the same in relative terms but considerably larger in 
volume compared with the 1970s and 1980s figures. ODA to SSA throughout the 1990s 
reflects Japan’s global position and significantly, its commitment to SSA. Significantly, 
Table 4.1 reveals the pattern of aid distribution has globalised Japan’s aid policy from what it 
had been with only the Asian region in consideration. It is clear since TICAD I, Japan created 
an international role for itself as a global power and leading donor in SSA where it can assist 
in addressing humanitarian needs for the African continent using its Asian developmental 
model. This is what Japanese foreign policy hoped TICAD would achieve with Table 4.1 
indicating a quantitative growth in ODA distribution. In addition, as Demachi observes there 
was also a “desire to strengthen political relationship with African countries in order to gain 
support for Japan’s goal to win a seat on the Security Council of the United Nations” 
(Demachi, 2009:3).  Therefore, it can be said that Japan was to benefit politically from an 
increased performance in African ODA disbursement during this period where permanent 
membership on the Security Council of the UN was the goal.  
 
This data shows that all three rationales have been enacted for ODA to Africa. Humanitarian 
reasons, economic reasons (particularly for development purposes on the continent) and the 
desire to be treated as a global power politically are the stated motivations for aid 
distribution. The increase in the quantity of ODA at this time speaks of the importance and 
the urgency to meet the Security Council objective. 
 
In the same post-TICAD I (1994-2003) period Japan has managed to outperform other major 
international donors, a position it has maintained from the end of the Cold War until the year 
2001. Table 4.2 demonstrates this trend where Japan’s share of 20% in bilateral ODA has 
been the highest throughout the first two TICAD processes. In Table 4.2, the “of which” 
figures indicate to government loan proportion of ODA in the case of Japan. 
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Table  4.2: ODA performance of G7 countries (in billion dollars) 
 
 1994 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Share 
of 
DAC  
1994-
2003 
Total 
Share 
of 
DAC 
(1994-
2003) 
U.S. 9.9 9.1 10 11.4 13.3 15.8 23% 101.9 18% 
Japan 13.2 12.2 13.5 9.8 9.3 8.9 13% 110.9 20% 
Of which 
government 
loans(Japan) 
4.3 5 4.1 2.7 2.3 1.9  32.5  
E.U. 30.4 26.7 25.3 26.3 29.9 36.8 54% 292.8 52% 
of which 
France 
8.5 5.6 4.1 4.2 5.5 7.3 11% 63.2 11% 
of which 
Germany 
6.8 5.5 5 5 5.3 6.7 10% 60.9 11% 
of which 
U.K. 
3.2 3.4 4.5 4.6 4.9 6.2 9% 40.5 7% 
of which 
Italy 
2.7 1.8 1.4 1.6 2.3 2.4 3% 19.8 4% 
Canada 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.5 2 2.2 3% 19.1 3% 
G7 Total 46.6 39.4 40.2 38.2 42.6 49.5 72% 416.3 74% 
DAC Total 59.2 53.2 53.7 52.3 58.3 68.5 100% 560.3 100% 
Source: Akiyama & Nakoa, 2005:6 
 
Japan’s ODA performance prior to the period covered above is seen in Table 4.3. The data is 
significant in that it confirms Japan’s position as a top donor by the end of the Cold War but 
as the table shows (Table 4.2), Japan lagged behind in its efforts of being a major donor prior 
to its turnaround in the post-1990s and the decade thereafter. 
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Table 4.3: Japan’s ODA Performance Pre-1990 
 ODA  
($ 
million) 
Increase 
(%) 
ODA/GNP 
(%) 
DAC/Average 
ODA/GNP 
(%) 
ODA(Yen 
billion) 
Increase 
(%) 
1977 1,424 28,9 0,21 0,33 3,825 16,7 
78 2,215 55,5 0,23 0,35 4,663 21,9 
79 2,638 19,1 0,26 0,35 5,781 24,0 
80 3,304 25,3 0,31 0,37 7,491 29,6 
81 3,171 -4,0 0,27 0,35 6,993 -6,6 
82 3,023 -4,7 0,28 0,38 7,529 7,7 
83 3,761 24,4 0,32 0,36 8,933 18,6 
84 4,319 14,8 0,34 0,36 10,258 14,8 
85 3,797 -12,1 0,29 0,35 9,057 -11,7 
86 5,634 48,4 0,29 0,35 9,495 4,8 
87 7,454 32,3 0,31 0,35 10,782 13,5 
88 9,134 22,5 0,32 0,36 11,705 8,6 
89 8,965 -1,8 0,32 0,33 12,368 5,7 
Source: ODA Annual Report, 1990: 41. 
 
A comparison of Japan’s ODA performance in the pre-1990 and post-1990 periods suggests 
that Japan raised its aid distribution profile worldwide in the latter part of the 20th century. 
The volumes which began to increase at the end of the Cold War were to mature to far larger 
amounts in the period thereafter. As a result, Japan has risen in ranks and has outperformed 
other major donor countries. 
 
Figure 4.1 below, illustrates the kind of aid distributed from the era of the Cold War through 
to the end of TICAD II (1990-2002) by Japan. This ODA, as stated comprises four 
components: grant assistance, loans, technical assistance and contributions to international 
organisations. 
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Figure 4.1: Japan’s ODA: Flows by Type 
 
Source: Akiyama & Nakao, 2005:9. 
  
As discussed in Chapter 3, Japan has had to confront considerable changes in international 
politics throughout the second half of the twentieth century. This is reflected in Fig. 4.1 
which shows how Japan began to feature more prominently as an ODA donor post-1990. 
Since the turn of the century, as the world’s largest ODA donor much of Japan’s ODA 
disbursement has been done multilaterally through TICAD process and other gatherings such 
as the G8 Summits. This strong multilateral showing by Japan suggests a moral rationale 
approach to its distribution efforts. 
 
4.5 The G8 Summit process 
Since 1990 the G8 Summit has become the most recognisable process in which the world’s 
most industrialised and wealthiest nations come together annually to discuss and help assist 
the underdeveloped parts of the world. Among the many discussions held at these meetings, 
Africa remains at the heart of development discussions and, the outcomes have important 
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consequences for the continent.  Japan’s role in this multilateral group will be examined 
especially its position towards SSA. Only three G8 Summits will concern us here as these 
summits have focused considerably on Africa than others. 
 
4.5.1 The G8 Summit 2000 
The G8 Summit of 2000 hosted in Kyushu-Okinawa was momentous for Japan. In the 
discussions, attention was given to Africa by the official statement that the group was “deeply 
concerned about the growth of armed conflict on the continent of Africa. Africa must 
mobilise the political will to prevent and resolve armed conflicts. We stress the rule of law; 
good governance and democracy are indispensable elements to achieve that goal. We 
reaffirm our strong commitment to help. We also reaffirm our commitment to support 
Africa’s quest for peace and stability” (MOFA, 2000:3). 
 
Significantly, Japan’s initiative to invite the Heads of States (Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, 
and the Prime Minister of Thailand) for discussions that ran concurrently with the Summit 
was applauded by all the G8 Leaders. The forum for exchange of opinions also included 
representatives of the World Bank, the World Health Organisation, the United Nations 
Development Programme and information technology businessmen. The meeting hosted by 
Japan’s Prime Minister, Yoshiro Mori, was the first of its kind. It was recorded by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “The keyword during the meetings was ‘partnership,’ with the 
developing countries stressing both a ‘global partnership’ and ‘action oriented partnership.’ 
The former points the importance of North-South dialogue, and the latter stresses 
commitment through action as opposed to rhetoric. The need for action was a strong desire 
that emanated from the developing countries” (MOFA, 2000).  
 
Apart from the fact that Japan’s gesture  to invite leaders from the developing world included 
Africa, this summit’s advantage for SSA was that it gave them another platform for promises 
(albeit with plenty of rhetoric) to provide assistance and direction for Africa on areas which 
they needed to address. 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
56 
 
4.5.2 The G8 Summit 2005 
The G8 Summit of 2005 was another important step for Africa’s development. It marked the 
end of the ten year timeframe for countries to meet their Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) where the focus was placed on Africa - which at the time, was not on track to meet 
the MDGs. In the process, all G8 countries committed themselves to providing aid to SSA 
and in joining Japan’s financial commitments made at the summit. One of the resolutions of 
this Summit at Gleneagles noted that: “Japan intends to increase its ODA volume by $10 
billion in aggregate over the next five years. Japan has committed to double its ODA to 
Africa over the next three years and launched the $5 billion 'Health and Development 
Initiative' over the next five years. For the 'Enhanced Private Sector Assistance (EPSA) for 
Africa' facility, Japan will provide more than $1 billion over 5 years” (Gleneagles Summit, 
2005). 
 
The international response towards Africa’s renewal was based not only on 
recommitting to past agreements but on what was further agreed during the summit. 
The conclusion reached for SSA was that “the G8 re-committed itself to partnering with 
African nations to achieve their vision of sustainable growth, development and active 
participation in the world economy. The G8 set out concrete measures that will have a 
real impact on bettering the lives of African people” (The White House, 2005). 
 
 
The significance of this cannot be understated. The meeting was based on two targets: 
poverty in Africa and climate change. The most significant aspect which developed 
from the summit was that an additional 50 billion US dollar aid package would be 
allocated and directed towards poverty alleviation. For Japan, it was a forum in which it 
pledged to double the amount of aid going to Africa for the next three years. In terms of 
Japan’s aid performance by 2005, 11% of Japanese ODA was already directed towards 
Africa. 
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4.5.3 The G8 Summit 2008 
Like many G8 Summits before, this summit held in Japan, discussed Africa’s development. 
The outcome for SSA was that the world leaders at the summit, rather than making new 
pledges, reiterated pledges made previously in 2005 on issues of development, Africa and 
food security.  In addition a pledge was made to increase ODA to Africa by 25 billion US 
dollars a year by the year 2010. 
 
The reaction particularly by the Africa Progress Panel acknowledged the efforts particularly 
of the Government of Japan for including and engaging African governments throughout the 
summit. The Africa Progress Panel confirmed this by stating “the G8’s renewed commitment 
to deliver the pledges at Gleneagles is a welcome. The Panel calls for G8 countries to specify 
both how and when they will deliver on the undertaking they have given to their own 
electorates, the peoples of Africa and the broader international community” (Africa Progress 
Panel, 2008). 
 
One of the key statements of the G8 Summit on Africa suggests commitment to Africa. “The 
G8 has long been committed to Africa’s development. The G8 and other donors are 
delivering on the ODA pledges to Africa and other developing countries made at Gleneagles 
in 2005. Of the $25 billion additional aid projected to accrue to Africa by 2010 as a result of 
these commitments, more than $12 billion of additional aid has been delivered by the DAC 
donors since 2004. This indicated substantial progress” (MOFA, 2008:1). But in spite of 
these pledges made by developed nations - including Japan, these countries have been 
increasingly criticised for failing to meet their commitments. Thus far, reality and rhetoric 
remain somewhat apart. 
 
However, these three G8 Summits represent a platform upon which Japan pursued it goals 
and intentions, established through TICAD to promote and maintain Africa’s agenda on the 
international scene and in the process it strengthened multilateral support for Africa’s 
development. There can be no doubt that by playing a greater role internationally, Japan 
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benefited not only Africa but also enhanced its own prestige and significance on the world 
stage.  
 
For Japan, the G8 Summit process reflects both moral and political rationales while at the 
same time economic rationale is implied.  While the process itself was borne out of a moral 
rationale, addressing and attending to the plight of the poorest of nations on the planet - it was 
also a stage on which Japan could further establish its political commitment towards the 
African continent. TICAD was promoted through the G8 process in the hope that, apart from 
a commitment to Africa, it would improve Japan’s prestigious position amongst the world’s 
powers an equal both economically and politically. Japan no longer wanted to be known just 
as an economic power but as capable of being a world political power. For Japan, it was 
hoped that this would ultimately lead to a permanent seat at the United Nations Security 
Council. 
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Chapter 5: Japanese aid in Africa and the advance of its SSA 
agenda post-TICAD III (2003-2011) 
 
Chapter Five focuses on the post-TICAD III period and the role Japanese aid played at this 
time. The first point to highlight is that the start of TICAD III marked a decade out to 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 2015.  Japan has always declared its supports for 
the MDGs and continues to encourage the need for the international community work 
together to achieve the set goals. 
 
A crucial moment in the development of the MDGs was undertaken in 2000, where eight 
MDGs were embraced by world leaders who each committed to their achievement by 2015. 
The MDGs have since had an effect on global development, where the goals can be 
monitored successfully but on the tenth anniversary of the MDGs in 2010 Japan’s ODA was 
in decline by 40%. At this point Japan had relinquished its position as the top ODA donor, 
where “its ODA is around half of the U.S’s, lower than the U.K’s and only slightly above 
France’s and Germany’s ODA. In 2006, Japanese ODA was US$ 11.6 billion, of which $3.1 
billion was debt relief” (End Poverty 2015, 2006). At this time Japan also ranked rather low 
among the group of 22 OECD donor countries, where its aid efforts were far below the 
OECD average. 
 
Overall, Japan considers MDGs to be an important concept of goals, through which the 
international community should work in unison in order to achieve its objectives. Japan has 
contributed in the provision of ODA both bilaterally and multilaterally for the improvement 
of human security, a point which Japan has always advocated strongly. Japan has confirmed 
that it will continue its “assistance to Africa in accordance with the pledges made at TICAD 
IV while making all-out efforts for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. 
The pledges referred to here are the doubling of ODA without debt relief by 2012 including 
doubling bilateral grants and provide up to 4 billion USD of loans to Africa over 5 years” 
(MOFA, 2010). This chapter will now focus on whether Japan has met its pledges. The 
objective is to determine whether Japan’s rhetoric is reflected through its performance.  
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5.1 The post-TICAD III process 
TICAD III was launched in 2003 commemorating the tenth anniversary of the TICAD 
process, and this third conference was one of the most important dedicated to African 
development. In the opening address Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi reviewed the three 
pillars of the ODA Charter which would guide Japan’s assistance to Africa, consolidating 
peace, reducing poverty through economic expansion; and promoting human-oriented 
development. He also made the commitment of providing one billion US dollars in grant aid 
towards the continent. The conference covered three important areas.  “First the conference 
reaffirmed TICAD commitments over the past decade, and discussed the future orientation of 
the Process including the support of NEPAD. Second, it expressed for stronger ties between 
TICAD and NEPAD and finally human security as the underlying framework for poverty 
reduction” (MOFA, 2003).  
 
The fourth TICAD conference was on 28-30 May 2008, held in Japan was significant in that 
the conference was to be followed by the G8 Summit – also to be held in Japan - so whatever 
concerns about Africa which emerged from TICAD IV were sure to filter through to the 
summit which also concerned itself with African development. The participants at TICAD IV 
committed themselves to working together towards achieving the four interrelated goals: 
• “Boosting economic growth 
• Achieving the Millennium Development Goals ( which include ensuring human 
security, education and health) 
• Peace consolidation and good governance 
• Addressing environmental issues and climate change” (Ampiah, 2008). 
 
TICAD IV also reaffirmed the contributions of the TICAD process to African development 
over the past 15 years by acknowledging the improvements African countries were making 
particularly in consolidation of peace, good governance, economic growth, and social 
development. The major achievement of the conference was the Yokohama Declaration 
which confirmed the political commitment of Japan to SSA’s development. The authorities of 
Japan also managed to secure development assistance to the value of four billion US dollars 
in soft loans to SSA as well as committing to the doubling its grant aid and technical 
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assistance to the continent. In spite of all these commitments, however, questions remained 
whether Japan’s rhetoric would measure up to reality. 
 
5.2 Japanese ODA disbursement 
The flow of Japan’s ODA between 2004 and 2007 is shown by the data in Table 5.1 below. It 
illustrates Japan’s efforts at this time. 
 
Table 5.1: Japan’s Bilateral ODA to SSA, 2004-2007 
(Net Disbursement) 
Year ODA Total 
(US $ million) 
SSA’s Share of Total 
Japanese ODA %) 
2004 1731 19,25 
2005 2318 17,12 
2006 4730 38,46 
2007 2897 33,68 
Cumulative Total 
(2004-2007) 
11 676  
Source: Data Report, 2011 
 
The Data Report (2011) on the flow of aid at this time points out “that Japan has delivered its 
commitment to double bilateral assistance to Africa. Despite reading its 2007 target, Japan’s 
aid level in 2007, in real terms, was still less than its ODA to Africa in 1989/90. According to 
OECD figures, Japan’s bilateral aid to sub-Saharan Africa in  2007 was $ 1,61 billion, thus 
surpassing the 2007 target for bilateral assistance of $ 1,22 billion” (Data Report, 2011). 
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In quantitative terms, Japan has been successful in doubling its aid efforts which, at face 
value, suggested an economic driven aid disbursement. However, on further examination, 
Japan’s aid performance at this time speaks a great deal about the political commitment 
which TICAD suggests it to be. It also appears from this, that the importance for Japan’s 
relationship with SSA with respect to its UN Security Council ambitions cannot be 
underestimated. 
 
The next significant phase in the TICAD process was in 2008. TICAD IV was hosted in May 
of that year - again a month prior to the G8 Summit.  In the course of the TICAD IV event 
Japan made several announcements concerning its assistance to Africa one of which was that 
Japan committed itself to doubling its average ODA to the continent for the period (2008-
2012). It was the same pledge made in 2005. In addition to its commitments, Japan’s other 
announcements addressed matters that had to do with infrastructure, investment, agriculture, 
health and education. These commitments expressed at TICAD IV further confirmed Japan’s 
consistent political obligations to African development, a commitment consistent since 
TICAD I. 
 
As the undertaking to African development is based on its ODA Charter and the TICAD 
process as well as the hope to be more effective than the traditional Western approaches to 
Africa’s development, Japan regards African economic growth as an effective mechanism for 
reducing poverty, and great emphasis is placed on development like building infrastructure 
and basic services. But this is not all. The advantage for Japan is that while meeting these 
international obligations Japan’s visibility in Africa has been maintained and in the process 
strong bilateral relations have been established as in the creation of TICAD as an inclusive 
body has activated important links with the UN. 
 
Africa’s political importance is important to Japan because as a group of nations it is a 
powerful union which accounts for 25% of the UN General Assembly. Simply put, Japan 
seeks a permanent seat at the UN Security Council and Africa is instrumental at achieving 
this goal. Economically, while Africa’s raw materials have also been important to Japan, they 
also ensure, among other things, the steady and concrete outcomes of TICAD IV.  Overall 
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Japan’s ODA is an important factor in Japan’s diplomacy. ODA remains a tool of Japanese 
diplomacy, a consistent trend since the 1950s – and it is for Japan’s traditionally non-Western 
approach to African development. In conclusion Japan’s upward trajectory of its ODA 
disbursement to Africa reflects Japan’s political commitment and meeting its international 
obligations. 
 
Japan’s ODA objectives have focused on distributing debt packages. This was given some 
attention at the G8 Gleneagles Summit, where a point raised about debt forgiveness (debt 
relief) observed that as loans make up a large portion of Japan’s ODA disbursement would 
hurt Japan’s foreign aid strategy of promotion of self-help if recipient governments were not 
to follow through in their commitments. Where Japan has distributed ODA loans to highly 
indebted countries, it should expect that the process might not always bear the intended 
domestic economic benefits for these countries. It can be said that Japan’s need to play a 
greater role in humanitarian and poverty reducing efforts, was also inspired by having the 
need to respond to international criticism and pressure. 
 
Japan’s engagement with  SSA is shaped by a number of key principles, of which aid flows is 
intended to target the promotion of self-help efforts, utilise local knowledge and to have a 
non-interventionist approach, lessons drawn largely from its experience in Asia. In 
considering all these factors Japan’s ODA performance throughout this period reflects 
considerable effort at addressing debt relief on the continent and an investment in 
infrastructure and basic services as the figure 5.1 suggests. 
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Figure 5.1: Sectoral shares of Japanese ODA to SSA between 2005 and 2009 
 
 
Source: Wild, Denney, Menocal & Geddes, 2011:20. 
 
In comparing Japan’s performance at this time (Fig 5.1) with other major donor nations (see 
Fig 5.2 below) it can be seen that debt relief has been a major focus of Japan’s ODA 
disbursement. 
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Figure 5.2: Sectoral shares of other donors’ ODA to sub-Saharan Africa 
between 2005 and 2009 
Source: Wild, Denney, Menocal & Geddes, 2011:21. 
 
Some of the reasons why it has performed so differently to other major donors at this time, 
was firstly, Japan was displaced as the world’s leading donor country as a result of the 
country’s recessionary period and financial deficit, which have impacted negatively on 
Japan’s aid (excluding debt relief) to Africa. However if one includes, debt relief, Japan has 
continued to increase its ODA disbursements, where there has been a closer monitoring of aid 
flow and its effectiveness. However, the overall picture has it that Japan still lags behind 
other major donors as Table 5.2 indicates. 
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Table 5.2: ODA (USD billions) to SSA from top 5 donors by total volume and 
Japan 
 2000-2009 
IDA 55 
EU Institutions 46 
France 40 
United States 54 
Germany 22 
Japan 17 
Source: Wild, Denney, Menocal & Geddes, 2011:14. 
 
Japan has historically distributed its aid to a number of countries on the continent, covering 
all the major regions.  However, as the literature cautions, it should also be remembered that 
Japan has taken a different route to other donor countries. It has given priority to certain 
countries for various reasons addressing humanitarian problems, maintaining security of its 
own resources and partnering with Africa in achieving certain objectives. Japan regional or 
country focus with regards to aid operates on “a key countries approach, giving priority status 
to certain countries based on a range of factors, including their interdependence with Japan, 
resource deposits and levels of poverty” (Wild, Denney, Menocal & Geddes, 2011:24).  Fig 
5.3 reflects this process with Japan’s top ten major partners in Africa.  
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Figure 5.3: Top 10 SSA recipients of Japanese ODA, 2005-2009
  
Source: Wild, Denney, Menocal & Geddes, 2011:25. 
 
5.3 Japan-SSA relations and China 
Japan has gained a great deal of approval among African nations for its role in maintaining 
the issues of Africa on the international stage. For the most part, it was Japan’s non-Western 
approach towards SSA which has received the most media, diplomatic and academic 
attention since the launch of TICAD. “With frequent news coverage and publications, not 
only people who have been  involved in aid, diplomacy, trade and research in and with 
Africa, but also the general public has also come to know some more about this continent” 
(Yamada, 2010). 
 
However, in recent years Japan has also been criticised by African states about the role of its 
ODA. This has centred mainly on Japan’s failure to meet its objectives and commitments. 
The feeling that Japan has not met its objectives and commitments emanates from a growing 
criticism by African states towards Japan, that there is a growing gap between rhetoric and 
reality.  In addition to these pressures directed at Japan, the increased visibility of China on 
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the continent has made Japan’s favourable or rather special position less secure in the minds 
of Africans. The Chinese development model is gaining favour in African countries as 
“China’s development of state-driven development without political reform is attractive since 
some of the Washington consensus reforms have not always reduced poverty in Africa” 
(Kurlantzick, Shinn and Pei, 2006). 
 
China’s presence on the continent has received a great deal of interest in recent times. It has 
been observed that for China, presence in African indicates firstly, that relations with the 
continent are being tested to see how China will develop as an international power, and what 
its role will become in the world, and secondly China’s entry into a region where interests 
have been secured for some time and if China is to have success on it, it will have to 
cooperate with various actors. What is meant by this is that though colonialism has come to 
an end in Africa, former colonial powers still have close relations with their former colonial 
territories therefore China needs to be aware of this condition.  
 
Chinese interests on the continent appear to hold similar goals as other countries. It is 
concerned with securing energy resources for itself which Africa can provide; and it can 
negotiate political risks other nations would not be willing to accept such as funding a 
development path without making political demands. In addition China may appeal as model 
of development for many African states, and finally “Chinese aid has the benefit of 
decreasing the threat of China directly competing against African nations” (Kurlantzick, 
Shinn and Pei, 2006). 
 
China’s declared strategy towards Africa has five components. “First, China stresses that it is 
a different type of global power, one that understands Africa’s development needs. Secondly, 
China also cultivates African nations which do not have significant pre-existing international 
relations, either those that have become pariah or recovering from conflict, thirdly it stresses 
that China-Africa relations is a win-win situation, fourthly, China does not interfere in 
African domestic politics and finally Chinese travel to Africa to get acquainted with the 
continent more so than other major countries” (Kurlantzick, Shinn & Pei, 2006).  
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Like many other countries, China uses aid as a tool to assist in implementing its strategy in 
Africa. However, it has a different approach in disseminating its aid through decisions it 
makes unilaterally rather through multilateral organisations. China has also made its mark on 
the continent culturally by promoting its language, so making an impression on the political 
fraternity in various African countries. China also makes investments to promote trade and 
strengthen ties with the continent. 
 
Chinese aid to Africa has received a greater prominence while Western aid donors have 
contributed enormously but have produced little in terms of returns on aid programmes. 
However, China has to some extent attempted to fill this void by moving more quickly and 
swiftly producing tangible results from their engagement with the continent. In comparison 
with the other non-Western donors to the African continent like, Japan, Olander notes that 
“Beijing asks for very little in return from its African partners in the form of political 
accountability and transparency” (Olander, 2010). 
 
China’s interactions with the continent is from a different position to that of Japan’s more 
concrete commitments through the TICAD process and G8 Summits on multilateral levels 
with clear objectives such as promoting self-help efforts on the continent, promoting peace 
and stability in the region and the world, emphasising the importance of Africa’s renewal and 
significantly bringing Africa’s issues on the international scene. Japan’s consideration of the 
political context to which it wishes to distribute aid has always been careful not to direct aid 
to governments and equivalent bodies. China on the other hand pursues a far less 
interventionist path, it does not behave multilaterally, and it does not probe into the political 
context of a recipient state and has no forum through which it makes its commitments clear 
regarding aid to Africa and its intended purpose. 
 
5.4 Japan and South Africa post-1990 
Present ties with Africa rest on Japan’s second key pillar in foreign policy - its relationship 
with South Africa. Japan and South Africa share a long and significant relationship and a 
long and difficult history. The diplomatic difficulties emerged from a long-standing economic 
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partnership which came under great scrutiny during the apartheid years made all the more 
significant as a result their strong commercial links during the apartheid years. In the post-
1990 era re-energised relations between the two countries began with the end of apartheid 
and the birth of democracy in South Africa. Japan has since embraced South Africa as its 
core partner on the continent. 
 
During Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori’s first-ever visit to Africa in 2001 (see chapter three) he 
made South Africa the first stop and gave reason for Japan’s desire to establish a new starting 
point between Japan and the continent. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs data records that 
“although South Africa is very far from Japan, Prime Minister Mori pointed out that the 
desire to hold an exchange of views from a wide perspective on such issues as a blueprint for 
Africa’s renewal, international community’s support toward the continent, and the future 
direction of international society” (MOFA, 2001). 
 
South Africa was also one of the few developing countries invited to the G8 Summit of 2000, 
as a representative of the developing world. Also South Africa was a major player in the 
construction of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), which provides a 
framework for the long-term development of Africa. The establishment of this framework 
was done in conjunction with TICAD which requires the input of Japan. On his tour to South 
Africa in 2001, Prime Minister Mori added his support to the African Renaissance headed by 
President Thabo Mbeki and in the process made a major acknowledgement to the part of the 
President’s active role in creating a safer world and a fairer world order through South 
Africa’s example of racial reconciliation. As such South Africa has been acknowledged as 
having an important role to play in Japan’s diplomatic objectives particularly towards SSA. 
 
Prior to 1994 the pattern of ODA disbursement was directed specifically to South Africa’s 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and anti-apartheid organisations but post-apartheid 
South Africa has attracted a great deal of aid from Japan and other powers. Although South 
Africa may be Africa’s largest economy at present, indicators have shown that the country 
qualifies to be a recipient of aid as it ranks low in terms of development profile  and in terms 
of social indicators such as health, education and sanitation and is among the highest in terms 
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of economic inequality. The legacy of Apartheid has left a skewed socio-economic mark on 
the country, a challenge which the new dispensation has yet to address adequately. 
 
Aid disbursement by Japan to South Africa had its beginnings in 1990 and began initially 
targeting particular entities, most of which were anti-apartheid groups and NGOs. Post-
apartheid South Africa was further rewarded by Japan which is recorded in the ODA data as 
follows: having witnessed South Africa’s triumphant embrace of democracy, Japan has 
announced its aid policy to assist that nation totalling $300 million, the majority of which is 
devoted to easing the severe living conditions facing many of South Africa’s non-white 
citizens. In April 1996, the first ODA loans to South Africa were provided in order to fund a 
long-scale effort to reform the enterprises supplying water to certain residential areas heavily 
populated by non-white citizens” (ODA Annual Report, 1996:69). 
 
In terms of Japan’s ODA disbursement pattern to South Africa, “Japan gave more technical 
assistance than grants. From 1994 to 1998, Japan devoted 25.12 % of its technical support 
compared 20.46 to grants. Between 1999 and 2001, 48.48 % of Japanese ODA was technical 
assistance compared to 42.31% for grants” (Ewing & Guliwe, 2004: 34). Clearly the pattern 
of aid disbursement was significantly accelerated as a result of the arrival of democracy in 
South Africa.  
 
Since 1994, the disbursement of aid has been on an upward trend. In 2002 South Africa’s 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affair Aziz Pahad confirmed Japan’s ODA commitment: South 
Africa is happy to note the considerable ODA funding Japan has been made available to 
South Africa. On the occasion of inauguration of President Mbeki in June 1999, Japan 
announced a second ODA package for South Africa in the amount of US $ 1,5 billion dollars 
for socio-economic projects largely targeted at the previously disadvantaged in South Africa” 
(DFA, 2002). This trend is certainly a reflection of Japan’s ODA Charter philosophies and 
principles. Most importantly “the ODA commitment was mainly intended for the previously 
disadvantaged communities in South Africa in sectors such as education, sanitation, and the 
provision of medical and water facilities. Japan has also supported South Africa’s human 
resources development programme and the auspices of the Japan International Cooperation 
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Agency (JICA). Many South Africans have participated in these very important and 
advantageous training programmes in Japan” (SA Embassy Japan, 2011).  
 
South Africa remains Japan’s most important commercial partner in Africa but aid has 
remained a low-key feature in the relationship since the turn of the century as modes of 
exchange were established between the two partners. As stated by Prime Minister Yoshiro 
Mori on his visit to South Africa, the country is seen by Japan as important to Africa’s 
renewal. This means that Japan’s ODA to South Africa reflects much of Japan’s diplomacy 
towards the continent, serving commercial interests, support of Africa’s development, and 
meeting international obligations. Overall one can deduce that Japanese aid to South Africa 
though directed for development issues was of greater significance for Japan. It was to 
establish Japan’s overall political commitment to Africa.  No place was more important to 
send such a message than South Africa, as it was deemed an important partner to promote 
Africa’s cause internationally as it could partner Japan in addressing the continent’s 
developmental challenges. 
 
5.5 Japan and SSA: 2011 and beyond 
The year 2011 has been particularly difficult and challenging for Japan. As the third largest 
economy in the world at this time, it has had to address the difficulties and challenges which 
the global financial crisis has instigated.  Other challenges were the effects of the massive 
earthquake and tsunami which the country experienced at the start of 2011.  The implications 
these unfortunate events would have on Japanese aid to SSA remains an issue of interest. In 
2010 Japan had successfully met its bilateral target and it nearly reached the volumes needed 
to meet its pledge to double bilateral development assistance to the continent by 2012, but no 
commitment has been made beyond this year.  
 
In spite of the many challenges Japan has had to confront, aid to SSA remains a goal to which 
it is committed. Tokyo has indicated that in spite of the massive reconstruction needed in the 
country, it remains steadfast in delivering all development aid to Africa. Japanese 
spokesperson, Satoru Satoh raised this point at the development meeting with African 
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ministers in Dakar, when he stated, “in spite of the disaster Japan is committed to continue 
our contribution to the international community and its contribution to peace, prosperity and 
development in Africa” (Bureau Report, 2011).  
 
Another confirmation of Japan’s commitment was that in spite of experiencing the effects of 
the earthquake on March 11, 2011, Tokyo committed not to cancel the TICAD meeting to 
show its obligations not only to Africa but also to the world. There remains Japan’s ambition 
to have a permanent seat at the UN Security Council and as a political bloc Africa remains in 
Japan’s opinion, significant in engineering change at the council while boosting Japan’s 
chances of being a member. 
 
5.6 Analysis 
5.6.1 Analytical Perspective 
The TICAD process was instituted by Japan with the purpose of alerting the international 
community on African matters. From its formation, Japan has been successful in conceiving, 
proposing, preparing and hosting conferences pertaining to African development. In the 
process Japan was successful to have partners from different backgrounds, all with the 
intention of focusing on African development. The TICAD process has received a great deal 
of support especially from Africa but questions remain about its purpose and intention and 
who does this process truly serve. The most consistent issue raised has been the gap between 
rhetoric and reality. This issue has its roots from the Cold War where Japan’s rhetoric about 
its policy to South Africa was criticised when it was measured against the economic reality of 
the time. 
 
It is without a doubt that Japan has increased its visibility on the continent through TICAD 
and with it; a number of directives were established. Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, in his 
2001 speech during his tour to South Africa, highlighted the basic directions which were to 
be taken: [a] comprehensive approach that includes the establishment of political stability, 
etc., ownership by Africans themselves and the building of partnerships with members of 
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international society, as well as promotion of south-south cooperation” (MOFA, 2001). In 
addition, Mori highlighted a number of points for future TICAD processes. They ranged from 
confirming Japan’s commitment to TICAD (specifically as a forum for Africans to discuss 
matters for development); the improvement of south-south cooperation; matters on how to 
fight infectious diseases; and also cooperation on information technology. 
 
It is imperative to understand what TICAD processes, intentions and achievements were.  It 
represents a forum in which international discussions are held. Its main focus is on Africa’s 
development, with attention given to the African Union (AU) and NEPAD, which has 
features of African self-help efforts. In the process, development aid continues to be the 
central policy measure of Japan’s diplomacy to Africa for the enhancement of economic 
development and the general welfare of the recipient states. This reflects an economic 
rationale for aid to the continent. ODA is important to Japan’s efforts as it solidifies its 
international efforts and stature and in the process advances improved bilateral relations and 
thereby develops Japan’s diplomatic position in the world.  
 
As Morikawa (2005:488) states, Japan’s goals are to emphasize its appeal to the international 
community as a nation with ‘the will and capability to contribute to peace and development 
as a global power,’ and to have Japan accepted as a major political power. This intent is 
reflected, for example, in the Japanese government’s claim for a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council. Japan reminds its diplomats of the importance of cultivating countries in 
the United Nations to increase support for Japan.  As African support represents a voting bloc 
of over 50 countries, Japan needs to repair the deep-seated criticism and distrust of African 
nations caused by their past promotion of a pro-Pretoria policy during Cold War era. In 
respect, TICAD has been an effective tool helping to repair Japan’s image. 
 
Although TICAD was created to counter aid fatigue at the time and also to initiate for 
consensus building around African issues, the process has also raised Africa’s suspicions 
about Japan’s indifference.  They question whether the TICAD Process has achieved its 
objective at least to the satisfaction of Africans is raised. They have also questioned whether 
the idea of Africans taking ownership of their development is making an impact. The rise of 
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China and its increasing presence sends a message that Japan no longer holds the reign as the 
sole provider of a non-Western model of development for Africa. Ampiah asserts that 
“TICAD is no longer alone in terms of Asia-based fora focused on Africa...the action-
oriented approach, and the aggressive, highly-visible character of some of the other initiatives 
to have emerged over the past few years [make] it clear the TICAD Process risks being 
overshadowed - especially in terms of delivery and effectiveness on the ground” (Ampiah, 
2008).  
 
What is certain is that the TICAD process has shown Japan’s continuous adjustments of its 
engagement with Africa. It has played an appeasement game to secure its national interests 
and also to meet Africa’s expectations. Therefore, its ODA disbursements are continuously 
sensitized to the changing environments, and China has, in recent times, reserved the right to 
be included in this changing environment. Japan can meet Africa’s expectation only by 
contributing more aid to the region, and addressing the debt problems through annulment. 
Japan, however, does not seem to possess the political desire at present for these challenges. 
As such, Japan is left with the option of continuing rhetoric of, promoting self-help efforts for 
Africans, providing aid for humanitarian purposes, and going on the offensive in seeking 
support from the international community.  The aid indicators reveal these are all just words 
with not a great deal to back up the intentions. As Morikawa states “Japan’s ODA budget 
peaked in 1995 at USD 145 billion. By 2003, it had dropped as much as 40% to USD 89 
billion. In other words, contrary to the strong impression Japan’s aid to African nations has 
actually decreased” (Morikawa, 2005: 492). 
 
The ODA performance of Japan post 2003 reflects the same patterns since the first TICAD in 
1992. Japan has certainly met the pledges it made in 2005 to double its bilateral assistance, 
although as the data shows, a lot more could be done by Japan as it is still been outperformed 
by other major donor nations. “Despite reaching its 2007 target, Japan's aid level in 2007, in 
real terms, was still less than its ODA to Africa in 1989/90. Moreover, Japan's total level of 
ODA for Africa actually declined by 8% between 2006 and 2007. Even though bilateral 
assistance increased between 2006 and 2007, multilateral assistance to Africa was cut by 
48%” (Data Report, 2008). 
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In conclusion, the TICAD process has presented itself as a process with many faces. The 
general understanding is that TICAD is not an aid pledging conference but a forum for 
exchanges of principles and strategies for Africa’s development. However, it is true to say 
that while TICAD has focused its consultations on a select number of African countries well 
(as suggested in Figure 3) the rest of the continent has only generated secondary interest from 
Tokyo. This has not gone unnoticed and has raised the ire of many African nations who have 
voiced their concerns through TICAD. Such a scenario is not surprising according to 
Morikawa (2005) who suggests that in the context of the four-layer structure of Japan's 
Africa policy, the he fourth and bottom layer is made up of around 30 countries while the 
third layer down is made up of just over a dozen countries being given preferential treatment. 
The second layer comprises Japan's regional partners like South Africa and Nigeria. The top 
layer of this structure systematically integrates the former colonial powers such as the U.S., 
the U.K. and France, as Japan's global partners. 
 
5.6.2 Theoretical perspective 
The TICAD process and the goals which Japan wished to achieve through the process can be 
explained by IR realism. One of the five characteristics of realism is that the state remains the 
major but not the only actor in international relations. With this understanding questions have 
been raised about Japan as the initiator of the TICAD process, of whether its intentions are 
genuine through the TICAD process or whether it is mere rhetoric for Japan’s foreign aid. 
 
 
Aid continues to be the measure of Japanese diplomacy on the continent and the TICAD 
process is at the centre of discussions regarding Africa’s development where aid is seen as 
the tool to ensure economic development and the welfare of the recipients. The political 
realism perspective can explain Japan’s position. Firstly, realists understand the condition 
under which foreign aid emerges is about the basic material inequality between donor and 
recipient. Japan which is an industrialised and developed country assumes the role of donor 
and condition of recipients on the African continent provides the reasons for aid distribution. 
Japan’s position has been that aid ought to improve economic and social development. 
However, it is important to note that as realists understand aid policies are driven essentially 
by the strategic interests of nation-states, for Japan, ODA is also important as it strengthens 
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its international efforts and stature which it wants to assume for a permanent seat on the 
United Nations Security Council. 
 
 
As stated, economic self-interest has been one of Japan’s primary motivating factors since the 
end of WWII when, Japan sought to use foreign aid in its quest for global economic 
supremacy. It has yet to deviate from this position as it is consistent with Japan’s apolitical 
nature, separating politics from economics, and it also defines national security in economic 
terms, using economic tools to secure economic objectives. This allowed Japan to have 
relations with South Africa during the Cold War in spite of the political pressure to which 
both countries were subjected too. The TICAD process then allowed Japan to play an 
appeasement game on the African continent to establish its own national interests.  
This study has argued that Japan’s primary interest for national security was to expand its 
economy and continue on the path of global economic supremacy. Part of using economic 
tools with aid was to secure economic and political objectives, and ODA from Japan to SSA 
has therefore increased in volume since the start TICAD Process, and the trend is likely to 
continue in spite of the difficult domestic issues the country has experienced especially in 
2011.  
 
 
Although Japanese presence has increased on the African continent particularly under the 
TICAD process, Japan’s intentions for meeting the commitments in African aid raises more 
questions than answers. However, as realists would suggest, despite intentions to assist Africa 
it should not be underestimated that Japan’s national self-interests and the importance of state 
survival are taking priority over aid distribution.  
 
 
The patterns of aid to Africa are made from a strategic calculation that only a number of 
states have received aid from Japan who has some political and economic influence on the 
continent. This may be seen as serving both Japan’s push for global economic supremacy and 
better for improving its international stature. Aid, as realists asserts is a tool which originated 
in the Cold War era to influence the political judgements of recipients. This on-going trend 
continues to explain much of Japan’s aid distribution to Africa as it appears to be more about 
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Japan seeking to appease Africa, rather than reducing the material inequality between donor 
and recipients. 
 
 
This study has tried to show that overall Japan’s aid relationship with SSA has been driven by 
three rationales. The prominence of each appears to have depended on the challenges of the 
time. Economic development and humanitarianism feature prominently in the aid relationship 
with the continent. Both are declared goals in Japan’s post-Cold War ODA Charter. 
However, aid distribution to Africa motivated by both economic and moral rationales could 
not be achieved without the consistent political commitments made on the part of Japan. Pre-
1990 Japanese aid distribution to Africa was fundamentally shaped by Japan’s commitment 
to the anti-communist struggle although economic and moral rationales at this time were a 
means rather than an end in Japan’s relations with the continent. 
Post-1990 has seen Japan assume a more visible position in Africa and as a promoter of 
Africa’s development agenda on the international stage. However, as with the patterns of the 
past, Japan has long sought to be recognised as a global power economically and politically 
and its efforts in Africa are suggestive of promoting and securing a long-time desire to be 
recognised as a global power for its UN ambitions. This study, therefore, suggests a political 
motivation to be the most prominent factor that has shaped Japan’s aid relationship with SSA. 
 
 
5.7 Japan and South Africa 
The relationship between Japan and South Africa in the context of Japanese-SSAfrican 
relations has always generated a great deal of interest and it can be labelled as an anomaly. 
Japan’s long and strong links with South Africa were based on economic terms whose 
economic influence remains profoundly unchanged even after the arrival of democracy to 
South Africa in 1994. Although Japan portrayed itself as a champion of anti-racism especially 
with regards to South Africa, Tokyo and Pretoria have continued to have close relations, and 
it can be claimed South Africa was Japan’s most important partner on the continent. In the 
Cold War era, the influence of ODA in Japan-South Africa relations barely existed 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
79 
 
Post-Cold War ODA policies towards Africa do not extend to South Africa owing to the 
trend of strong economic ties remaining intact thereby reducing the need for Japan’s aid 
transfers to South Africa. South Africa is more the cornerstone of Japan’s diplomacy towards 
Africa and occupies a role of coordinator, organiser and exchange for Japan’s diplomatic 
objectives towards Africa. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
Japan’s foreign policy has undergone considerable change over the last five decades and 
Africa has experienced its effects. This study’s analysis has demonstrated five major 
motivations behind the substantial shift in policy. Firstly, Japan saw long-term economic 
interests as the path to pursue especially in securing resources for a country which lacked the 
resources needed for its economy and security. Secondly, there were strong political 
motivations which were to secure a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council. 
Thirdly, Japan was pressured by the Japanese community - within and without the country to 
consider its t many humanitarian challenges globally. Fourthly, aid to Africa in the Cold War 
era was part of the strategy to counter the criticism directed to Japan for its commercial 
relations with South Africa. Fifthly, the disbursement of aid to Africa took into account the 
reaction it might generate from African states. 
 
Undoubtedly, post-1990 aid patterns changed enormously and were inspired by Japan’s new 
found energy after the ODA Charter of 1992 shifted Japan’s African policy.  The Charter 
embedded some of Japan’s political goals and intentions, which surfaced through TICAD. 
The six items of the ODA Charter, articulate Japan’s African policy as it deepened and 
widened Japan’s political commitment to the continent. Since then, ODA has become the 
principal tool of Japan’s diplomacy towards Africa, the patterns of which are reflected by 
ODA disbursals.  However, these disbursals have failed to meet expectations and African 
states have raised many questions concerning commitments which did not materialize as 
increased aid over this period. This study has shown that the resource dependency factor 
cannot be underestimated as helping Africa had benefits for Japan’s economy and its political 
ambitions. The processes of TICAD and the importance of the G8 Summits, have not 
completely erased African suspicions of Japan’s intentions in Africa, however, when Japan’s 
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ODA falls short of meeting the goals in the ODA Charter and becomes nothing more than 
Japan’s lip-service it can be said that it fails to inspire the self-help efforts it advocates. 
Unfortunately, although Japan’s TICAD initiatives intended to create a development strategy 
for Africa, today it reflects less of declaration to Africa and more of Japanese political 
rhetoric.  
 
South Africa has maintained its importance to Japan eve after democratisation although not 
as a major aid recipient. While it is without question that democracy, human rights and good 
governance have all been important political variables that see South Africa meeting all the 
criteria for its donors - including Japan it is South Africa’s political and economic stature on 
the continent that has been significant to Japan and has been instrumental in Japan’s ODA 
disbursement in Africa. Investment, trade and overall commercial links have resulted in 
Japanese aid being confined to special cases for South Africa as the country is deemed 
capable of addressing its own socio-economic challenges. Rather than being solely an aid 
recipient, therefore, South Africa is considered by Japan as crucial to Africa’s renewal due to 
its capacity to contribute alongside Japan at achieving this objective. In other words, Japan 
holds South Africa to be an important partner in achieving Africa’s development. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion  
6.1 Introduction 
Japan’s foreign policy has undergone considerable change over the last fifty years. With that 
been established, the distribution and pattern of aid from Japan has been affected in such a 
way that it reflects and compliments these changes in policy. Aid has been a great indicator 
of understanding foreign policy because it has been used as a tool in Japan’s foreign policy.  
 
Japan’s foreign policy possesses a number of features that guides its international 
engagements. These features are arrived at after taking into account a whole range of factors. 
This holds true with regard to Japan’s foreign policy to Africa. Japan’s foreign policy 
towards Africa post-WWII pursued the path of diplomacy, and aid as a tool. The 
disbursement and pattern of aid to Africa have been closely studied, but the reason why aid 
was given considerable importance in Japan’s diplomacy towards the continent remains an 
important area of enquiry. This study was particularly interested in the evolution of Japan’s 
aid relationship with SSA and the factors that have shaped it.  
 
This chapter will conclude this study by revisiting the essential factors that have guided this 
study. Three key aspects that will be revisited through the course of this chapter are the aims, 
rationale and context, discussing the findings in the empirical chapters, and finally the 
chapter will discuss areas for further investigation which will conclude the chapter. 
 
6.2 Context, aims and rationale 
Over the second half of the 20th century Japan’s economy grew extremely well and 
maintaining this momentum was something Japan had to constantly contend with. It also had 
to address a number of issues as to allow her to return to the international community as a 
peaceful nation. Appeasement became of great importance especially within its own 
neighbourhood, maintaining good relations with its ally, the US, which guaranteed Japan’s 
security and the search for new markets as to maintain the momentum of its growing 
economy were some of the issues it had to contend with. These factors were of great 
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importance for Japan to its readmission into the international community as a peaceful nation. 
Its relationship with SSA was plagued with many challenges. Its relationship with South 
Africa, which was considered as the cornerstone of its policy to Africa was heavily criticised 
especially during the Cold War. Foreign aid was absent in the Japan-South Africa 
relationship at this time. 
 
This study has focused on the volume and disbursement of Japanese foreign aid to Africa as a 
tool in Japan’s relationship with the continent. The study is set up as such that foreign aid is 
deemed as an indicator of Japanese foreign policy towards SSA. The literature concerning 
Japanese/SSA relations shares a great deal on Japanese economic interests on the continent 
and its dual policy and a great deal of time has been spent on Japan-South Africa relations. 
However, this study contributes in broadening the literature on Japanese-African relations by 
focusing on the aid relationship.  
 
Aid flow towards Africa served certain interests for Japan and the study emphasises that until 
democracy arrived to South Africa, it was used firstly to maintain its economic momentum, 
(see end of Chapter) to appease and minimise criticism from African countries for its 
relationship with Apartheid South Africa and to curb the spread of communism for its 
Western allies. The aim of this study was to highlight these trends where aid was a Japanese 
tool to maintain its interests and serve its foreign policy objectives on the continent.   The 
rationale is to contribute to the study of Japan-African relations and explore this new element 
in the literature by linking the literature and theory on aid as a diplomatic and political 
instrument. The study of aid flow from Japan to Africa has yet to be exhausted where much 
work needs to be done. 
 
6.3 Discussion of findings and their implications 
The empirical section highlights a number of factors that address the primary questions in 
Chapter 1. The question raised to get the empirical sections underway is why aid was an 
important factor in Japan’s relationship with SSA.  Japan’s policy towards SSA during the 
Cold War was understood to be Japan’s dual policy towards the continent. Existing 
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scholarship on Japan and Africa relations makes this position very clear, most notably 
through the study of Jun Morikawa (1997). Japan’s policy was categorised into two policies: 
Japan’s ‘Black Africa’ policy and Japan’s ‘White Africa’ policy, for which it received a great 
deal of criticism for its close ties with Apartheid South Africa.  Pre-1990 Japan-African aid 
relations were motivated by all three rationales. From an economics perspective, aid served 
as security for resources Japan desperately needed for its expanding economy. Africa was 
deemed a suitable candidate for the security of these resources particularly after the first oil 
crisis in 1973 where aid to the continent began to grow. From a political perspective, aid 
towards the continent served a number of objectives. As a growing economic force Japan was 
pressured by the United States to play a greater international role. As such its role on the 
continent was to assist the Western bloc in curbing the spread of communism. Japan also had 
ambition of being recognised as a global power. Thereby by promoting peace and stability on 
the continent this would serve its greater ambitions. From a moral perspective, aid to SSA at 
this time was for humanitarian purposes. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union brought a whole set of challenges particularly on the continent.  
 
Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy was established through the ODA Charter and the 
pillars which form the Charter. Japan’s position with regards to intentions towards the 
continent finds its expression through the TICAD Process. Japan expressed its position 
through the TICAD Process where it contributed in creating a framework where discussions 
could be held concerning Africa’s development. The objectives of the process were 
articulated during Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori’s tour to South Africa in 2001, where it was 
stated that a comprehensive approach at establishing political stability, promoting African 
ownership in its own development and promoting south-south cooperation were the 
motivating factors for this Process. 
 
The position of aid in Japan’s relationship with SSA is important as one can measure whether 
Japan meets its objectives. As TICAD became the platform upon which Japan was to express 
its policy position towards the continent, the position of aid would also be made clear through 
this process. As such, development aid held the position as the best central policy measure of 
Japan’s diplomacy towards SSA. The overall position of Japan concerning the role of aid is 
that it hopes to achieve an improvement in the economic development and general welfare of 
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recipient states. ODA is deemed important to Japan’s efforts; its international stature and 
efforts in the process advance bilateral relations. TICAD advances above all Japan’s national 
interests. The emphasis on improving its international position has much to do with past 
wrongs which stretch at least to WWII.  In Africa, it was deemed important for Japan to 
repair deep-rooted criticism and distrust by African nations especially for its pro-Pretoria 
stance during the Cold War era. TICAD was therefore seen as an effective tool to repair this 
tarnished image. At the same time Japan pushed ahead with its ambitions of being a global 
power, which meant a permanent seat at the Security Council. Africa was seen as an 
important partner that could help at securing this ambition. 
 
The TICAD Process has on the part of recipients raised more questions than given answers 
and has highlighted the divide between rhetoric and reality on the part of Japan. TICAD was 
initially created to counter aid fatigue and also to promote consensus building around African 
issues. The rhetoric on the part of Japan concerning its outright support for Africa’s 
development and promoting African issues on the international community measured against 
its aid disbursement towards the continent has raised many questions on the side of Africans 
about Japan’s true intentions for the continent. From the mid-1990s to the end of the second 
TICAD Process, Japan’s ODA budgets had decreased as much as 40%. Post-2003, Japan’s 
ODA performance followed a similar trend in spite of the many pledges made by Japan. To 
close with regards to aid, TICAD was not an aid pledging conference, but a forum to hold 
discussion on Africa’s development. The pattern of Japanese aid proved to favour a number 
of countries as highlighted in Fig. 5.3. However criticism of Japanese behaviour has emerged, 
and questions have been about her intentions and if aid was used as a tool to serve its 
appeasement strategy and benefit as a result. 
 
The position of Japan and its aid toward SSA is understood and explained through the realist 
perspective. It is an IR theoretical perspective that explains foreign aid as a part of national 
policy originated during the Cold War to influence political judgements. For realists, aid 
arises from a basic material inequality between donor and recipient and aid is deemed at 
reinforcing the underlying material inequality. It also pressurises countries to assume a 
position for its survival in a divided and un-policed political world. For Japan, national 
interests were the underlying factors for aid distribution to SSA. It had to firstly maintain the 
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momentum towards global economic supremacy which has long been its objective and as 
such maintain the survival of its economic position in the world. Other aspirations are for it to 
become an international peace player and seek a permanent seat on the Security Council. 
Through aid distribution to SSA, it hoped to improve its international stature, repair deep-
rooted suspicion of the country by African states, and finally to outcompete its economic 
rivals to achieve economic supremacy. Japan’s aid behaviour reflects most of the five 
characteristics of realism; that of its own survival and security which is expressed mostly in 
economic terms, its policy behaviour and distribution of aid is done in an un-policed and 
anarchical global system, the separation of politics and economics has been central to Japan’s 
foreign policy and is a reflection of Japan’s long-held apolitical position and gives some 
direction to its close ties with Apartheid South Africa. 
 
In terms of Japanese motivation for aid distribution to SSA, one can deduce that political 
ambition has been the most consistent reason for Japan’s aid relationship with SSA. Though 
it has ambitions of promoting Africa’s renewal and addressing humanitarian needs, Japan has 
played an instrumental role in the TICAD Process, a declaration one may say of its political 
commitment to the continent. 
 
6.4 Areas for Further Investigation 
New areas of enquiry can expand on the political motives for aid distribution towards SSA. 
The political aspects of this relationship have yet to be exhausted and as available data 
permits it should remain an area of enquiry. It would be important to closely study Japan’s 
political goals in the distribution of aid to the continent. What should be studied closer with 
regards to African-Japanese relations is the effect of the global financial crisis has had on aid 
disbursements towards the continent. The increased presence of China on the continent will 
continue to have implications for Japan’s relationship with the continent. Future studies 
should give attention and compare aid processes of China and Japan towards the continent 
and establish which of the non-western development model finds favour on the African 
continent. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
To close this chapter and bring an end to the study, the study has highlighted Japan’s foreign 
aid relationship with SSA.  This chapter has highlighted the factors which have guided the 
study, providing the aims, rationale and context of the study, discussions held pertaining to 
the empirical chapters and the findings disclosed and also areas for further investigation. This 
study contributes to the literature regarding Japan-African relations and by addressing the 
primary question in Chapter 1, foreign aid as a tool of foreign policy was used primarily as an 
instrument to advance Japanese political and also economic objectives on the African 
continent. 
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Addendum 
ODA Charter 1992 
 
The ODA Charter of 1992 was deemed a significant new step in Japan’s post-Cold War 
foreign policy. Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter Annual Reports of 1992 
provides other reasons for this new path by stating that  “as a major economic power, Japan is 
obligated to meet the expectations placed on it by international society, and is working to 
increase the quantity and quality, and to carry out this aid more effectively and efficiently” 
(ODA Annual Report, 1992:3). 
 
The ODA Charter finds its expression “through six items which constitute the pillars of the 
Charter: Basic Philosophy, Principles, Priorities, and Measures for the Effective 
Implementation of Official Development Assistance, Measures to Promote Understanding 
and Support at Home and Abroad, and ODA Implementation Systems” (ODA Annual Report, 
1992). 
These are defined further as: 
1)  Basic philosophy 
The Charter provides a number of basic philosophies to which Japan subscribes. It supports 
and promotes environmental conservation, the recognition of interdependence and 
humanitarianism as basic philosophies. Also as part of its efforts to uphold these 
philosophies, Japan, as a major economic power, has the goal of assisting poor nations with 
aid to develop their countries so that it may lead to peace, prosperity and stability. “Japan also 
reaffirms its stance that aid is meant to support self-help efforts” (ODA Annual Report, 
1992:44-45). 
2) Principles 
The principles of the ODA Charter are established in accordance with the principles of those 
of the United Nations but it avoids interference in the domestic affairs of foreign states. The 
ODA Charter is in accordance with the following principles. 
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• “Any use of ODA for military purposes or aggravation of international conflicts 
should be avoided. 
• “Full attention should be paid to trend in recipient countries’ military expenditures 
as to maintain and strengthen international peace and stability. 
• “Full attention should be paid in efforts for promoting democratization and 
introduction of market oriented economy in the recipient countries” (Diplomatic 
Bluebook. 1992). 
 
The Charter also stipulates that “since aid is intended to assist the economic and social 
development of developing countries to improve the well-being of their inhabitants, the 
materials obtained with that aid must not be used for military purposes. This has been 
consistent policy of Japan in its aid programs” (ODA Annual Report, 1992:46). 
 
3) Priorities 
For Japan, the historical, geographical, political and economic tie with Asia means that this 
region remains a priority for Japanese assistance. At the same time, Japan remains aware of 
other areas of the world including Africa which are also in need of assistance. “In Africa 
many countries are earnestly moving toward democratization and structural adjustment. It is 
necessary to continue providing cooperation in the area of basic human needs (BHN) and in 
easing poverty through humanitarian assistance” (ODA Annual Report, 1992:47-48). 
 
4) Measures for the Effective Implementation of Official Assistance 
The Charter provides fifteen key points as measures for effective implementation of ODA 
and for upholding the principles of the Charter. 
 
5) Measures to Promote Understanding and Support at Home and Abroad 
The dissemination of information and the strengthening of public relations and development 
education are the foundations of this objective. 
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6) ODA Implementation Systems 
To ensure that ODA meets its objectives, it is not only imperative to increase the level of 
ODA but to ensure that the implementation process allows for aid to be effective and 
efficient. The implementation system ensures an improvement in ODA, both in the increase 
of quantity and, if necessary, of increased personnel engagement in ODA activities. 
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